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Viewing cable 05KABUL5181, KUNDUZ POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE BAGHLAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05KABUL5181 | 2005-12-20 12:12 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005181
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A
STATE PASS USAID/W FOR ANE
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF GE
SUBJECT: KUNDUZ POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE BAGHLAN
POLICE FORCES
¶1. (U) Summary: Highway Police forces throughout the
north and northeast and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces
in Baghlan province are both dominated by Tajik warlords
and drug traffickers. General Abdul Khalil has assigned
former jihadi/Hezb-i-Islami loyalists from Baghlans
Andarab District to the majority of positions in the
e
Highway Police. Under General Mustafas influence, General
Mir Alam and other Tajik warlords also dominate the ANP in
Baghlan. Patrons in the Afghan Ministry of Interior
support and reinforce competing power players in Baghlan
without regard to corruption and drug trafficking. END
SUMMARY.
----------------------
HIGHWAY POLICE NETWORK
----------------------
¶2. (SBU) Since 2003, General Abdul Khalil Andarabi has
been leading a government condoned drug cartel known as the
North and Northeast Highway Police Brigade (also known as
Second Brigade), controlling the roads and much of the
narco-trafficking from Faryab to Badakhshan provinces.
Khalil, a former Tajik jihadi from Baghlans Andarab
District, was a Jumbesh battalion commander under the
Ishmaelite leader Sayyed Jafar Naderi. Khalils father,
Juma Khan, was an eminent commander of Hezb-i-Islami in the
Andarab area, hence the influence of his fathrs
supporters in the North and Northeast Highway Police
Department.
t.
¶3. (SBU) General Khalil reportedly has had the support of
two very influential Ministry of Interior (MoI) officials:
the Acting Minister of Interior, Mr. Zarar, and a former
Deputy Minister, General Helaluddin. Mr. Helaluddin, also
a Tajik from Andarab, was a military pilot during
Najibullahs time, and was then linked to Jumbesh. He
became Deputy Minister during the first transitional
government. Helaluddin recently won a seat in the Wolesi
Jirga representing Baghlan Province. General Khalil was
allegedly an active supporter of Helaluddins campaign.
¶4. (SBU) Since Khalils appointment, eight of the 12 (67
percent) most influential positions in the Highway police
department have been given to the people from Andarab, and
a total of eight (out of 12) people are the former Hezb-i
Islami activists and sympathizers of Khalils father.
Khalils cronyism has resulted in an ethnic repartition of
the department. At the highest level in the Highway Police
lice
Department (battalion commanders and general staff), 11 out
of 12 are Tajik, while only one person, the Deputy Highway Police
Chief, is a Pashtun. The latter is professional and seems to be
without political affiliation. (Nevertheless, the Deputy
Highway Police Chief, Colonel Nasser, does not have a
spotless reputation, as he, too, worked a number of months
for Bashir Baghlani when the latter was Baghlans
provincial governor under the Taliban regime.) Khalils
cronyism is readily evident in the fact that two of 12
important positions, namely the Reconnaissance Officer and
the Commander of the First Battalion, were openly offered
to Khalils uncle and to the nephew of General Helaluddin,
respectively.
¶5. (SBU) Political connections between Baghlan and Kabul
have proven lucrative for Helaluddin and Khalil (both from
Andarab), and to some extent Acting Minister of Interior
Zarar. This political web of support has been highly
influential in the narco-trafficking throughout the North
th
and Northeast regions from Badakhshan (the regions main
producer of opium and heroin) to Faryab. However, this
political network of drug traffickers faces stiff
competition in Baghlan and Kunduz. General Mustafa is
another native of Andarab who, along with his group of
merry men affiliated with Hezb-i-Naween (HNA)/Jamiat, runs
the competing trafficking rings in the Northeast Region.
Mustafa is joined in this endeavor by the native of Kunduz
and former commander of the 54th Division, current Baghlan
Chief of Police Mir Alam.
-------------------------
PROVINCIAL POLICE NETWORK
-------------------------
¶6. (SBU) General Mir Alam. The situation in Baghlan
started to deteriorate after the June 2005 appointment of
General Mir Alam as Provincial Chief of Police. Mir Alam
is a Tajik, former Jihadi and former commander of 54th
Division, affiliated to HNA and still linked to various
armed groups. Apparently, the decision to appoint Mir Alam
as Chief of Police was taken without consulting Mr. Jalali,
the former Minister of Interior. Since the collapse of
Taliban regime, the followers of General Mustafa, former
commander of the 20th Division, and people linked to
HNA/Jamiat have acted as the primary decision-making group
within the provincial police headquarters. Mir Alam is but
the most recent to join this brotherhood under Mustafa.
Mir Alam is linked to Qanooni and Marshal Fahim and is also
said to share a very good relationship with Acting Minister
of Interior Zarar.
¶7. (SBU) With Mir Alams new police administration and
the dismissal of most of the local authorities (district
and provincial), 12 of 16 (75 percent) of the new chiefs of
police in the province (District Chiefs of Police and the
Provincial Chief of Police) are the followers of
HNA/Jamiat. Of the 16 principal officers, 11 are Tajik,
four are Pashtun, and one is Uzbek.
¶8. (SBU) Unlike the highway police, there is more
diversity among the senior officers of the ANP in Baghlan:
two of the seven most influential authorities in this
department are professional police officers, apparently
without political affiliation; three are linked to the
Andarabi commanders (HNA/Jamiat); but, most intriguing, is
that two of the seven senior officers are closely linked to
the Chief of Highway Police, General Khalil. The ethnic
breakdown for senior leadership in the Baghlan Police
Headquarters is 86 percent Tajik and 14 percent Pashtun.
¶9. (SBU) The June 2005 appointment of General Mir Alam
(linked to Hezb-i-Naween), followed by the September 2005
appointment of Mohammad Alam Rasekh as the Baghlan
provincial governor (linked to Jamiat), has definitely
reinforced the Tajik dominance within the province and
specifically within the police department. Due to the
continued vacancy of the Minister of Interior position, MoI
Deputies like General Dawud and Acting Minister Zarar are
able to exert great influence in Baghlan and reinforce
HNA/Jamiat control over all aspects of society, especially
the riches of narco-trafficking.
¶10. (SBU) PRT COMMENT: The rivalry between the ANP and
the highway police is becoming more and more pronounced,
particularly over the control of drug trafficking and the
general domination of Baghlan province. Rather than providing
stability, the police forces are among the principal
destabilizing factors in the province. The recurrent theme in the
northeast region remains Kabuls lack of political will to remove
known warlords and drug traffickers from office, especially
police chiefs. Dominant figures such as Khalil and Mir Alam
continually undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan central
government, yet wield enough influence with powerful figures in
Kabul to maintain positions of authority indefinitely. If the
security reform, DIAG and counter narcotics efforts are to
succeed, the police forces of Northeast Afghanistan must be
purged of their corrupt officers.
END PRT COMMENT.