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Viewing cable 06PARIS741, TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES RECENT EVENTS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS741 | 2006-02-03 15:03 | 2010-12-09 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO5506
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #0741/01 0341536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031536Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3915
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1163
RUEHWD/AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 0279
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0091
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0012
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000741
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES RECENT EVENTS
AND HIS PLANS TO ENTER POLITICAL FRAY
REF: A. 05 PARIS 4103
¶B. LOME 55
¶C. PARIS 553
¶D. 05 PARIS 952
¶E. 05 PARIS 1229
PARIS 00000741 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Togo's former Interior Minister Francois
Boko on January 31 discussed Togo-Cote d'Ivoire arms
trafficking (planes piloted by Belarusian mercenaries were
involved in the November 2004 bombings in Cote d'Ivoire and
had transited Togo, but France did not pursue information
Boko says he provided); political developments in Togo
(President Faure uninterested in reform, continues to allow
and benefit from illicit activities of his associates); and
Boko's intentions to play a public role in Togo-related
politics. Boko and the head of the Paris law firm that
employs him also offered brief comments on China's activities
in Africa. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) At his invitation, we met on January 31 with
Francois Boko, who had served as Togo's Interior Minister
until April 2005, when he was removed from office, took
refuge in the German Embassy, and then left for exile in
France. Boko had broken ranks with the GoT by calling for
the postponement of elections in Togo in view of the
instability building during the pre-election period (Ref A).
TOGO-COTE d'IVOIRE ARMS TRAFFICKING
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) Boko commented extensively on the links between Togo
and the November 6, 2004, bombing in Cote d'Ivoire, when GOCI
forces attacked a French military base, killing nine French
soldiers and an Amcit civilian. He said that the two
Sukhoi-25 aircraft used in the bombing had been provided to
the GOCI by former French gendarme Robert Montoya (Refs B and
C). Montoya had obtained these and other aircraft and
military equipment from Belarus and had also engaged
Belarusian pilots and technicians. The planes had arrived
unassembled in Togo, where they were assembled and then flown
to Cote d'Ivoire. Boko said that the GoT leadership and
military were aware of the presence of the planes and
pilots/technicians in Togo. Boko said that French forces
also had to be aware of their presence because the Belarusian
planes were kept at the same Lome air facility the French
were using to operate their own air missions in support of
French forces in Cote d'Ivoire.
¶4. (C) After the November 6 bombings, Boko said that he had
had the Belarusian pilots/technicians arrested when they
returned to Togo from Cote d'Ivoire. He said that there were
nine of them. Boko said he furnished details about their
identities and activities to the French, through France's
Embassy in Lome and also through direct contact with General
Poncet, who then commanded France's Operation Licorne in Cote
d'Ivoire. Boko thought there would be high French interest
in the information he had conveyed but was surprised when the
French did not express much interest. After holding the nine
Belarusians for about two weeks, Boko was told by the French
(including General Poncet, who communicated directly with
Boko) to release them. The only explanation he received
(again including from General Poncet) was that France "was
not looking to complicate relations with Belarus over this
matter."
¶5. (C) Boko said he found this lack of French interest
surprising inasmuch as the bombing had resulted in the deaths
of French soldiers. He predicted that a scandal was brewing
that might erupt once French judicial investigation (Ref C,
paras 6-7) of the case unearthed more facts. Boko said that
recent French media reports on the "discovery" of a second
set of planes in Lome, along with their connection to
Montoya, were in fact an old story that the press should have
reported a year ago. This issue was "news" only because of
Judge Brigitte Raynaud's investigation, itself prompted by
legal claims on the part of the families of the soldiers
killed in the raid. The planes had been sitting unused at
the Lome air facility since the time of the bombings in Cote
d'Ivoire.
¶6. (C) Boko said that Robert Montoya was among the group of
French and other non-Togolese that had long had access to the
Eyadema regime. This group, which included Charles Debbasch
(Ref D), was involved in a great deal of nefarious activity
in Togo, Boko asserted, and had always enjoyed the protection
of the regime. Boko said that after the French press this
PARIS 00000741 002.2 OF 004
past week had begun reporting on Montoya, his arms
trafficking, and his connection to Cote d'Ivoire, Montoya's
wife went to a notary in Togo who handled Montoya's
businesses. This notary, according to Boko, dissolved all of
Montoya's businesses and then created new ones, but listed
different owners. This, Boko said, was done to protect
Montoya's assets should legal action be taken against him or
his companies. Boko said that the GoT had issued Debbasch a
Togolese diplomatic passport as a form of protection. Even
though Debbasch had been convicted of financial offenses in
France and was therefore subject to arrest (Ref E), Boko
claims that Debbasch traveled to France to celebrate the
December 2005 holidays without, apparently, being hindered by
the GoF.
7, (U) See concluding paragraphs of this message for recent
media reports on the investigation into the November 6, 2004,
bombing.
DEVELOPMENTS IN TOGO
--------------------
¶8. (C) Boko said that Faure was making no effort to
institute reform and seemed content to live within the
structures Eyadema had left for him. Boko related that the
small inner circle surrounding Faure (which included
foreigners such as Montoya and Debbasch) continued to carry
out their illicit activities, which benefited themselves and
Faure as well. This reliance on criminal or quasi-criminal
activities allowed Faure to lead a comfortable, if not
luxurious, life, and provided no incentive for him to
institute the kinds of reforms that might make Togo more
acceptable to international lenders or private sector
investors. All of which was very bad for Togo, in Boko's
view.
¶9. (C) Boko noted Faure's inability to gain international
"recognition." No one of significance wanted to meet with
him and he could be considered a pariah internationally. One
of his only formal trips abroad had been to Iran, and who
needed Iran's blessing, Boko asked rhetorically. Boko said
that Faure had nine wives, one of whom was a cousin of
opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio (see below), with another
being the daughter of Ghana's President Kufuor. Boko said
these marriages were useful for Faure politically.
BOKO EXASPERATED WITH THE FRENCH
--------------------------------
¶10. (C) Throughout the meeting, Boko expressed dismay with
French attitudes towards Togo. The French apparently did not
want to pursue the November 2004 bombing and the links with
Togo and Belarus, but this reticence, he again predicted,
could become more problematic if Judge Raynaud's
investigation gained traction with the media. (NOTE: French
investigative judges have a great deal of independence and
can pursue investigations that in some cases the rest of the
GoF might not want investigated. END NOTE.) Boko said the
French also did not seem concerned about Faure and his
failure to reform. Exasperated, Boko said France appeared
ready to do what it has done so many times before -- back
"the man of the moment" so long as "the man" can ensure some
degree of stability. Boko noted that the French had invested
so much in Eyadema that they perhaps could not contemplate
starting from scratch. He acknowledged that events in Cote
d'Ivoire, after Houphouet's death, may have served as a
lesson to the French in terms of seeking stability rather
than letting chaos ensue when a dynasty ends.
BOKO'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS
--------------------------
¶11. (C) Boko confided that he was soon going to re-enter
the Togolese political scene. He was scheduled to be the
main speaker at a February 4 event in Paris to which all
Togolese, the press, and friends of Togo were invited. He
explained that he was not speaking at this event to proclaim
himself as the "opposition's new leader," but instead hoped
that the meeting would allow for open discussion of events in
Togo and serve as a vehicle for uniting the Togolese diaspora.
¶12. (C) Boko said he planned to speak on three general
themes: (1) the need for Togo's opposition leaders and
members of the diaspora to put aside factional differences
and meet together to discuss Togo's future and adopt a common
roadmap for progress; (2) the need to reassure and win over
Togo's military by explaining that "reform" was not directed
against the military; and (3) the need to unite in demanding
that Togo's constitution and laws be respected, particularly
concerning presidential succession.
PARIS 00000741 003.2 OF 004
¶13. (C) Boko at an earlier meeting revealed that the GoF,
upon allowing him to live in France, suggested that he not
get involved in politics. Pressed about this, Boko countered
that he was not a formal "political refugee" and that he was
therefore not subject to GoF control over his activities. He
did say, however, that he had informed the GoF that he would
not speak publicly about "sensitive" issues, such as the
Montoya affair or Togo's role in international drug
smuggling. He told the French that he would focus on Togo's
future and how to instill political change in a positive
manner. Boko indicated that GoF security elements provide
intermittent surveillance of his home and workplace to
protect him and his family.
RIVALRY WITH OLYMPIO?
---------------------
¶14. (C) Boko said he did not have much contact with
Gilchrist Olympio, who seemed to want to avoid Boko and who
resented the possibility of Boko's becoming a new opposition
figure. In Boko's opinion, Olympio was past his prime and
should understand that a new generation was on the scene. It
was futile for Olympio to try to refight political battles
dating back to the 1960s, when Eyadema ousted Olympio's
father from power and may have been involved in his death.
Boko was very annoyed that after the February 4 meeting was
announced in December, Olympio a few weeks later announced a
meeting of his own, to take place at the same time and on the
same date as Boko's February 4 meeting. To Boko, this was a
ham-fisted attempt to disrupt Boko's meeting. Boko said the
Togolese community harshly criticized Olympio's announcement.
Realizing his error, Olympio had not said anything further
about holding his meeting and Boko was not sure it would take
place. Boko expected 400-500 to attend Boko's meeting.
¶15. (C) Boko also criticized Olympio for his willingness to
meet with and possibly curry favor with Faure. He noted that
Olympio seemed to go out of his way to travel to places where
he knew he would have a chance to meet with Faure. This,
Boko claimed, discredited Olympio in the eyes of the Togolese
diaspora. As a parting shot, Boko said that Olympio suffered
credibility problems because Faure was married to one of
Olympio's relatives.
¶16. (C) COMMENT: It was not clear from Boko's remarks the
extent to which he is prepared to anoint himself a leader (or
THE leader) of the Togolese opposition. He denied that he
intended to do so, speaking of his simple desire to unite the
Togolese people. Still, his own ambition did not lie deeply
below the surface of his comments, and we will try to assess
his motives as well as the degree to which the Togolese
community views him as a new leader. END COMMENT.
¶17. (SBU) BIO NOTE: Boko said he was happy working at the
law offices of Alain Feneon, where he is one of five lawyers
engaged in facilitating the work of non-African companies in
Africa. He said, however, that he was applying for one of
the four vacant vice-presidency positions at the African
Development Bank. At the same time, his French-citizen wife
was applying for a position at the EU in Brussels, which
would require commuting daily by TGV. He said he did not
know how feasible obtaining either job would be, as they
would both place strains on the Boko household, which would
be complicated by the birth of his second child within the
next few weeks. Boko said the couple also had a
nine-year-old son.
VISIT TO LAW OFFICE, COMMENTS ON CHINA
--------------------------------------
18, (C) Boko offered a tour of his law office, where we met
with the firm's head, Alain Feneon (PROTECT THROUGHOUT). The
firm is heavily engaged in providing consulting services and
legal advice to companies doing business in Africa and to a
few African groups seeking opportunities in Europe. The firm
has operated since 1978 and Feneon has been closely involved
in the OHADA project to harmonize the commercial and business
laws of several African countries. He described the
difficulties of reconciling civil and common law approaches
but stressed the great progress OHADA has made.
¶19. (C) Feneon and Boko described the appeal of Africa to
international businesses, particularly those interested in
infrastructure development and resource extraction. Boko
said he was working on several projects involving UNDP
activity in Africa and one case involving Benin and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation. Boko noted that Faure had
recently rescinded an oil contract with the Hunt Oil Co.; he
suspected that Faure would make a new deal with the Chinese.
PARIS 00000741 004.2 OF 004
¶20. (C) Feneon said he was aware of "at least 500 Chinese
companies," most of which were state owned, seeking
opportunities in Africa. He said the Chinese were
"interested in everything." Several clients of Feneon's firm
are Chinese and he provided a brochure on the firm printed in
Chinese. Feneon described one case involving China and
Namibia. He said that Namibia had been unable to repay a
Chinese loan. The Chinese, he said, quickly told Namibia,
"don't worry about it. Just give us 5,000 passports and
residency documents." Feneon claimed that 5,000 Chinese
families were resettled in Namibia as a result and were now
engaged in any number of small and large business activities
in Namibia. Feneon commented that this kind of arrangement
helped solve two problems for the Chinese: easing population
pressures and establishing communities in Africa that could
be of use to China later.
PRESS REPORTS ON TOGO-COTE d'IVOIRE-MONTOYA
-------------------------------------------
¶21. (SBU) Paris daily Le Monde carried two articles on
January 31 concerning the investigations into the November 6,
2004, bombing incident in Cote d'Ivoire and the Togo/Montoya
connection. This followed previous Le Monde coverage
reported Ref C. One article said that Judge Raynaud's visit
to Togo in mid-January had been useful and that she obtained
numerous documents implicating Montoya, whom she reportedly
wanted to prosecute for "complicity" in the bombing. French
General Michel Masson of the French military's Directorate
for Military Intelligence reportedly confirmed Montoya's
involvement in supplying the two aircraft that did the
bombing. The article also outlines Montoya's involvement
with the Belarusian pilots/technicians (the article says
there were eight of them, whereas Boko said there were nine).
The Belarusians were reportedly released from Togolese
custody into the care of a Belarusian woman who turned out to
be Montoya's secretary. Le Monde reports that Montoya is
also under investigation by Togolese authorities. Montoya is
quoted in the article as admitting his involvement in the
affair but denying its illegality.
¶22. (U) The second Le Monde article contains statements by
the Ivoirian members of the crews of the two aircraft
involved in the bombing (both aircraft were piloted by a
Belarusian with an Ivoirian co-pilot). The Ivoirians are
quoted as saying they did not intend to attack the French
base but rather nearby hostile forces. Because of the
proximity to the base, any bombing of the French was
accidental.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton