Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AR
ASEC
AEMR
AORC
AJ
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AE
AU
AFIN
AX
AMED
ADCO
AG
AODE
APER
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AM
AL
ASIG
ABLD
ABUD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
AGMT
ATRN
CO
CH
COUNTER
CDG
CI
CU
CVIS
CIS
CA
CBW
CF
CLINTON
CM
CASC
CMGT
CN
CE
CJAN
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CG
CS
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CV
CAN
ECON
ETTC
ELN
EPET
ENRG
EFIN
EAID
EINV
EG
EWWT
ELAB
EUN
EU
EAIR
ETRD
ECPS
ER
EINT
EIND
EAGR
EMIN
ELTN
EFIS
EI
EN
ES
EC
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENVR
ENIV
EZ
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ECA
ET
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IR
IS
IAEA
IZ
IT
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
IN
IO
ID
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
IIP
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INRB
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
KNNP
KDEM
KIRF
KWMN
KPAL
KPAO
KGHG
KN
KS
KJUS
KDRG
KSCA
KIPR
KHLS
KGIC
KRAD
KCRM
KCOR
KE
KSPR
KG
KZ
KTFN
KISL
KTIA
KHIV
KWBG
KACT
KPRP
KU
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KV
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KTIP
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KMCA
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KVPR
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBIO
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KHDP
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
KCOM
KDEV
MOPS
MX
MNUC
MEPP
MARR
MTCRE
MK
MTRE
MASS
MU
MCAP
ML
MO
MP
MA
MY
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASC
MASSMNUC
MPOS
MZ
MOPPS
MAPP
MG
MCC
OREP
ODIP
OTRA
OVIP
OSCE
OPRC
OAS
OFDP
OIIP
OPIC
OPDC
OEXC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PREL
PTER
PINR
PINS
PARM
PHUM
PARMS
PREF
PBTS
PK
PHSA
PROP
PE
PO
PA
PM
PMIL
PL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
PRAM
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PGOF
SMIG
SNAR
SOCI
SENV
SO
SP
SW
SHUM
SR
SCUL
SY
SA
SF
SZ
SU
SL
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
SN
SG
UK
UNGA
UP
UNSC
UZ
UN
UY
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNO
UNEP
UG
US
USTR
UNHCR
UNMIK
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06REYKJAVIK107, ICELAND: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 31 DEFENSE TALKS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06REYKJAVIK107.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06REYKJAVIK107 | 2006-03-29 11:11 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Reykjavik |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRK #0107/01 0881116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291116Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2657
INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0223
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0195
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000107
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
OSLO FOR DATT AND ODC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: NATO MARR PREL PGOV KPAO IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 31 DEFENSE TALKS
REF: A. REYKJAVIK 85
¶B. REYKJAVIK 90
¶C. REYKJAVIK 91
¶D. REYKJAVIK 92
¶E. REYKJAVIK 93
¶F. REYKJAVIK 97
¶G. REYKJAVIK 98
¶H. REYKJAVIK 106
Classified By: Ambassador Carol van Voorst Reason: 1.5 (a) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Since 3/15, when the U.S. announced the
realignment of its force presence at Naval Air Station
Keflavik (NASKEF), the Icelandic government has made its
unhappiness with the decision plain. FM Haarde ) the
government,s key decision maker ) is looking to the 3/31
talks to offer the sort of specificity that will enable him
to tell his party and his public that the Americans are
serious about their commitment to the 1951 Defense Agreement.
Our readiness to offer concrete and credible proposals in
the series of defense talks with Iceland will strengthen
Haarde,s preference (and that of pragmatic bureaucrats and
rising young politicians and other opinion leaders) to seek
continued close security ties with the U.S. Eed summary.
----------------------
UNANTICIPATED DECISION
----------------------
¶2. (C) The Government of Iceland is just now coming to terms
with the news delivered March 15 that the U.S. would be
removing its four F-15 fighter jets as well as combat search
and rescue (CSAR) assets from NASKEF. Governing Independence
(IP) and Progressive (PP) Party luminaries seemed genuinely
shocked that the U.S. would take this step without further
negotiations or a long drawdown calendar. There have been a
flurry of party meetings and town hall, meetings with
residents of the Sudurnes region (where the base is located),
and the subject has been discussed in ministerial calls on
Allied foreign ministers (Norway, Denmark, France and
Germany) and Russia,s foreign minister. The Prime Minister
has appealed to the NATO Secretary General. Although there
has been plenty of criticism from the opposition that the
government should have seen this decision coming, the
governing coalition,s complete lack of contingency planning
indicates its leaders assumed they would have much more time
to prepare the country.
----------------------
REACHING OUT TO EUROPE
----------------------
¶3. (C) In response to what many interpret as U.S. rejection,
Reykjavik is showing new interest in cooperation with the
Europeans. &I think it is clear that in the future, Iceland
will move closer to Europe and farther away from the United
States on foreign-policy issues,8 PM Asgrimsson told
Morgunbladid in late March. Influential Social Democratic
Alliance Chairman Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir said it would
be natural for Iceland to rely for defense cooperation on
countries bordering on the North Atlantic: the UK, Denmark,
and Norway. Haarde himself is building bridges to Europe but
not burning any with the U.S.: he is enough of a realist to
know that European governments are unlikely to offer more
than sympathetic noises, and that any European offers of
defense equipment are likely to be on a purely commercial
basis.
¶4. (C) At the same time, a current of resentment against the
U.S. has also been flowing (reftels). The sudden
&unilateral8(to repeat a word embraced these past two weeks
by politicians, pundits, and citizens alike) decision, coming
in the course of what ministers had presented to the public
as ongoing negotiations, is being painted as evidence of U.S.
egotism and arrogance ) even by opposition politicians happy
to see the base close, and ordinary citizens with no
particular interest in the base or even the broader concept
of national defense.
----------------
PLAYING CATCH-UP
----------------
¶5. (C) Only fully independent since 1944, Iceland has little
experience looking out for itself ) or, set in a more
negative light, little sense of answerability for its own
well-being.
¶6. (C) Some in the Icelandic Government (e.g. FM Haarde and
chief defense negotiator Albert Jonsson) are nervous that the
U.S., with limited strategic interest in maintaining any sort
of presence here, will quietly bow out of the 1951 Agreement
(refs A and D). Others (e.g. PM Asgrimsson and Justice
Minister Bjarnason), feeling betrayed by the style and
substance of decisions already announced, no longer trust us
to meet our responsibilities under the treaty (refs G and H).
A third faction (which we believe includes former PM/FM
David Oddsson as well as other Independence Party stalwarts
of his generation) believes Iceland should react to the U.S.
decision by abrogating the treaty themselves and seeking
security elsewhere in the Alliance (ref D). And then there
is the pacifist left (personified by Left Green Party
Chairman Steingrimur Sigfusson), which never believed the
U.S. was a good mate for Iceland and has been only too happy
to crow, &We told you so8 (ref B).
¶7. (C). Asgrimsson and Haarde have reacted quite differently
to the U.S. decision, both in public and private. The PM has
strongly criticized the pace and unilateral character of the
U.S. action, expressing skepticism that the U.S. will offer
serious alternatives to a full-time U.S. presence. In
contrast, Haarde (in the job for only a few months, and with
his ego tied less tightly to past government defense policy)
has taken a more measured tone, expressing regret while
focusing on the need to listen with an open mind to U.S.
proposals and seek to maintain the security relationship.
Haarde has been out of the country much of the time since the
announcement, which has resulted in Icelandic media giving
more play to Asgrimsson,s tough talk than to Haarde,s
forward-looking focus.
---------------
GETTING SERIOUS
---------------
¶8. (C) Within this cacophony is a core of career diplomats
and bureaucrats sincerely interested in a practical
U.S.-Icelandic partnership to confront the challenge of
providing national security in the 21st century. MFA
Political Director Bergdis Ellertsdottir and Defense Director
Jon Egill Egilsson, as well as Justice Ministry Legal
Director Ragna Arnadottir and Coast Guard Director Georg
Larusson, are all serious professionals who know that banging
their fists on tables will not prevent a terrorist attack or
save a drowning sailor.
¶9. (C) Though the working levels of the ministries have been
kept out of the information loop of late (ref D), they will
be present at the March 31 talks. Some among them have even
told us that they are excited to be present at the
creation,, to have their ideas on defense actually influence
their nation,s program choices as Iceland inevitably
develops a more independent security policy. We anticipate
that their relatively pragmatic and worldly approach will
ultimately prevail, in part because a rising generation of
MPs, local mayors, and other decision makers share their
pragmatic approach to security cooperation.
¶10. (C) Icelanders, who lived on a subsistence economy until
the last half century but now enjoy one of the world,s
highest standards of living, are above all practical people.
When they face the fact, as they must do soon, that other
Allies are not going to leap in to replace the defense goods
and services thus far supplied by the U.S., they will sign on
for a new, more evenly balanced course of cooperation. We
can make this evolution easier if we:
-- Offer concrete proposals for follow-on security programs,
of the sort now being worked by OSD, Joint Staff, and EUCOM,
that provide a &visible defense presence.8 Exercises,
rotational deployments, and enhanced information/intel
sharing will also make a strong impression.
-- Follow up the March 31 meetings with a series of detailed
proposals responsive to Icelanders, concerns as expressed in
our face-to-face meetings.
-- Remain attentive to domestic political imperatives. The
U.S. decision to keep some CSAR helicopters here until the
middle of September came as an enormous relief to Icelanders
scrambling to arrange for interim and long-term SAR
capability. Justice Minister Bjarnason said March 24 that he
aimed to propose an interim Icelandic SAR plan within three
weeks and a long-term plan within two months. The Icelanders
will be very interested in the information we supply at the
talks on FMS options. Whether or not Iceland decides to buy
American (and it might make sense for them to simplify
maintenance by buying more of the Eurocopter Puma or Dauphins
they already fly), we must be prepared to put forward some
serious options. Continuing our efforts to be helpful to
local base employees who are losing their jobs will also pay
dividends in public goodwill.
-- Initiate public and private links such as the proposed
Burns op-ed and periodic telephone calls. These public
manifestations of sustained USG interest in Iceland,s fate
would smooth the way for a mutually-beneficial follow-on deal.
-- Encourage them to get educated ) and to accept that they
too have responsibilities for security. Even with the U.S.
remaining its defense guarantor, as a wealthy country and
member of NATO, Iceland will have to pay towards its defense,
and its officials will finally need to do their homework on
security affairs so as to be educated consumers. This means
reiterating longstanding offers to welcome Icelanders to U.S.
service academies, war colleges, and the Marshall Center )
but also making clear that other forms of cooperation will be
contingent upon their developing their own security
expertise.
-- Finally, we should remain unruffled by calls for closer
European security ties, making it clear that the U.S. does
not feel threatened by Icelandic calls for closer security
ties with Europe, either in a NATO or EU context. Indeed, we
welcome burden sharing.
VAN VOORST
van Voorst