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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIJING10909, A/S HILL'S MAY 25 WORKING LUNCH WITH VFM WU DAWEI
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIJING10909 | 2006-06-02 00:12 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO5322
OO RUEHPB
DE RUEHBJ #0909/01 1530021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020021Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7305
INFO RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 4353
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0633
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKN/AMEMBASSY KOLONIA 0008
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0121
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0125
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0056
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0551
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 010909
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2021
TAGS: PREL CH
SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S MAY 25 WORKING LUNCH WITH VFM WU DAWEI
BEIJING 00010909 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: DCM David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) Visiting EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill
urged VFM Wu Dawei to improve relations with Japan and use
PRC influence to push the Burmese regime to release Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK) during a May 25 working lunch. A/S Hill also
noted the negative impact of PRC/Taiwan competition on
Pacific Island states. Wu stressed that Beijing seeks
improvement of relations with Tokyo but has no choice in its
response if Japan does not handle history issues properly.
He expressed satisfaction with the meeting between Foreign
Ministers Li and Aso. Wu complained about the Burmese
regime, noting that the PRC has raised ASSK but that the
senior military leadership views her as a threat and is
unlikely to release her. Wu closed by urging U.S.
participation in the East Asia Summit and saying that China
will not challenge the U.S. role and our interests in East
Asia. End Summary.
¶2. (S) During a May 25 working lunch, visiting EAP Assistant
Secretary Christopher R. Hill discussed Burma, Japan and East
SIPDIS
Asian regional architecture with PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu
Dawei. Wu opened by saying he had closely studied A/S Hill's
recent speech in Singapore, noting his satisfaction with the
positive characterization of the PRC role in the region as
well as the potential for greater U.S.-China cooperation.
Japan
-----
¶3. (S) A/S Hill told VFM Wu that we are concerned about
China-Japan tension and urge both sides to make a serious
effort to stabilize their relationship. Acknowledging Wu's
explanation about historical issues, A/S Hill said that
Americans remember Pearl Harbor but that this has not
prevented us from welcoming Japan's evolution into a peaceful
and democratic country that plays a positive role in the
world. A/S Hill said we are committed to making U.S.-Japan
relations work for us, for Japan and for the rest of the
world.
¶4. (S) Wu said the PRC recognizes that it was the United
States that defeated Japanese militarism, saying that the PRC
made a specific effort to call attention to the U.S. role in
WWII in various commemorations of the 60th anniversary of the
end of the war in order to remind Chinese of the U.S.
contribution. Rehashing familiar points, Wu said that if PM
Koizumi wants to worship class-A war criminals at the
Yasukuni Shrine, that is his business, but not when he is
Prime Minister. Wu cautioned that while Japanese officials
like to say that they share U.S. values, this is not true
when it comes to history. Urging the United States to talk
to Japan as a friend about the need to show greater
sensitivity about the history issue, Wu commented that it is
in the U.S. interest for Japan to improve relations with the
ROK as well as China. In addition to the Yasukuni Shrine
issue, Wu highlighted continuing delays in cleaning up
abandoned Japanese chemical weapons as a festering problem.
This is not just a historical issue, as farmers continue to
stumble on decaying chemical munitions, according to Wu.
Beijing takes relations with Tokyo very seriously and fully
understands their importance to both countries as well as to
the region. The PRC hopes Japan will handle the history
issue appropriately, Wu said, adding that Beijing has no
choice in how it responds if Tokyo does not improve the
situation.
¶5. (S) Asked about the Doha meeting between Foreign Ministers
Taro Aso and Li Zhaoxing, Wu expressed guarded satisfaction,
saying the two had agreed to work together to overcome
obstacles to better bilateral relations. This includes
improving cooperation in other fields, according to Wu, who
noted that he knows Aso well and considers him a "pretty good
guy" from his time as Ambassador in Tokyo.
Burma
-----
¶6. (S) A/S Hill raised Burma, noting that ASEAN countries
complain that their leverage over Rangoon is limited because
BEIJING 00010909 002.3 OF 003
of Beijing's support for the regime. A/S Hill urged the PRC
to use its influence to convince the Burmese regime to stop
isolating itself, release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), and begin
true reform efforts, noting that continuing along the current
path is dangerous to Burma, its regime and to the region.
¶7. (S) Wu responded that there has not been real peace in
Burma for over 50 years, as no government has been able to
completely resolve lingering ethnic disputes. Civilian and
military governments have tried and failed, according to Wu,
who commented that despite all of the military regime's
faults, it is possible that they have done better on ethnic
issues than previous governments. The security situation in
Burma, particularly in the Northeast, is very volatile.
Noting that there had been an outbreak of fighting on May 24,
Wu said that a number of Burmese had fled across the border
into China. Such incidents threaten stability on the Chinese
side of the border. In addition, the flow of narcotics from
the Golden Triangle has an impact on the PRC, according to
Wu, who said that Beijing is increasingly frustrated with the
Burmese regime where one person makes every major decision.
The PRC had been caught by surprise when the regime moved the
capital to Pyinmana and was once again surprised when it
changed the capital's name earlier in the week, complained
Wu.
¶8. (S) When pushed by A/S Hill, Wu said the PRC has raised
ASSK on several occasions, explaining to the Burmese that her
release would send a positive signal of support for national
reconciliation. Burmese officials made clear that their
vision for national reconciliation does not include ASSK,
said Wu, commenting that the most senior leaders fear her and
are unlikely to release her. Chinese leaders have also
discussed the need to reach out to political parties and
change the constitution, but with little response other than
reiteration of Burmese statements on ethnic reconciliation.
Wu complained that during a 2005 visit, he held 12 hours of
talks in which his Burmese counterpart who read from only one
page of talking points, constantly repeating himself. The
PRC supports Burma because it is a neighbor, not because
Beijing likes its policies, stressed Wu, who said China is
trying to make clear to the Burmese leadership that they must
open up their country in order to promote economic
development. The PRC does not like the military regime but
expects it to continue in power for the near future.
Pacific Islands
---------------
¶9. (S) Acknowledging that VFM Wu is not directly responsible
for Beijing's relations with the Pacific Islands, A/S Hill
stressed our concern that competition between the PRC and
Taiwan is fueling corruption that weakens already precarious
island states. Wu agreed that "money diplomacy" is bad, but
blamed the phenomenon entirely on Taiwan, asserting that the
PRC does not give money directly to individuals in return for
diplomatic recognition. A/S Hill pointed out that the PRC
does provide a variety of assistance projects in Pacific
Island states that are often identified as providing side
benefits for local leaders. This can have a similar impact
to direct payments, commented A/S Hill, who noted that
Australia and New Zealand have expressed concern about the
destabilizing impact of PRC/Taiwan competition as took place
in the Solomon Islands. Wu said Beijing will continue to
work to improve its ties to the Pacific Island states but
also recognizes the importance of promoting stability and
welcomes the Australian and New Zealand roles in the region.
East Asian Architecture
-----------------------
¶10. (S) Raising U.S. concerns about the East Asia Summit
(EAS), VFM Wu urged the United States to participate in the
EAS. While ASEAN countries have internal differences on many
issues, they all want ASEAN to be in the driver's seat, Wu
stated. Noting that India, Australia and New Zealand do not
want to be second-class citizens in an evolving East Asian
architecture, Wu said Beijing hopes they will have equal
status under the 10 plus three framework. ASEAN countries
would like to see a U.S. role in the EAS, said Wu, who
commented that U.S. involvement would be positive for all
concerned, including China. U.S. investment, market access
and technology played a major role in developing Japan, South
BEIJING 00010909 003.3 OF 003
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The United States is now
playing a similar role in China's development as well as with
most ASEAN states. Wu said the PRC will not challenge the
U.S. role and interests in East Asia.
¶11. (U) A/S Hill's party cleared this cable.
RANDT