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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE1782, NETHERLANDS/LEBANON/VENEZUELA/JSF: AMBASSADOR
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06THEHAGUE1782 | 2006-08-14 15:03 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO9888
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #1782/01 2261543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141543Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6543
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001782
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MOPS NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/LEBANON/VENEZUELA/JSF: AMBASSADOR
ARNALL'S 8/14 MEETING WITH PM BALKENENDE
REF:...
74802,8/14/2006 15:43,06THEHAGUE1782,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,06THEHAGUE1768,"VZCZCXRO9888
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #1782/01 2261543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141543Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6543
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY","C O N F I D E N T
I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001782
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MOPS NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/LEBANON/VENEZUELA/JSF: AMBASSADOR
ARNALL'S 8/14 MEETING WITH PM BALKENENDE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1768
¶B. THE HAGUE 1766
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende is confident
his Christian Democrats (CDA) will do better than originally
expected in the upcoming November elections, possibly even
beating Labor (PvdA) to remain the largest party in
Parliament. Balkenende welcomed the adoption of UNSCR 1701
on Lebanon, but was noncommittal on a possible Dutch
contribution to a peacekeeping force. On Venezuela,
Balkenende stressed that Dutch remain concerned about Chavez'
ambitions but feel they must take a ""subtle"" approach to
dealing with him. The Prime Minister remains committed to
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project but wants to avoid
handing an election issue to the opposition. Ambassador
Arnall briefed Balkenende on upcoming Embassy plans to
promote diversity and Muslim outreach and received an
enthusiastic response. END SUMMARY.
DOMESTIC POLITICS: CDA ON THE REBOUND:
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) During a 45 minute tour d'horizon meeting with
Ambassador Arnall on August 14, an obviously well-rested
Prime Minister Balkenende expressed cautious optimism about
the Christian Democrats' (CDA) prospects for November's
parliamentary elections. He noted that the gap between CDA
and the leading opposition Labor Party (PvdA) had narrowed
dramatically since the local elections last March, when polls
showed PvdA leading by 30 seats; today, only a few seats
(4-5) separated the two parties. Balkenende credited the
shift primarily to the strong performance of the Dutch
economy -- which, he said, vindicated the government's tough
reform policies -- but said that PvdA leader Wouter Bos'
missteps on pension reform and other issues were also
contributory factors. Balkenende made clear that the CDA
intended to campaign vigorously on his government's record in
upcoming months.
LEBANON: DUTCH STILL CAUTIOUS ON PEACEKEEPING ROLE:
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Turning to the Middle East, Ambassador Arnall thanked
the Dutch for their strong demonstration of support for UNSCR
1701 (reftel) and generally responsible approach to the
conflict. Balkenende reiterated Dutch support for the
resolution, but stressed that implementation on the ground
could be difficult. In response to the Ambassador's query,
Balkenende said the Dutch ""did not rule out"" participating in
the anticipated peacekeeping force in some way at some point
in the future, but argued that taking on a new military role
would be extremely difficult at this time. Dutch forces, he
noted, are currently deployed in Africa, the Balkans, Iraq
(via NTM-I), and Afghanistan. Adding a new mission during an
election year may be too much to ask. Echoing a familiar
Dutch theme, Balkenende added that the anticipated deployment
provided a good opportunity for ""other allies"" who are not as
stretched to shoulder greater international responsibilities.
VENEZUELA: ""SUBTLE"" APPROACH NEEDED:
-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Noting recent Dutch mixed signals regarding
Venezuela's bid for a UN Security Council Seat (ref b),
Ambassador Arnall pushed for a clear sign of support for
Guatemala. Balkenende responded that the issue was being
reviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stressed,
however, that the GONL remained deeply concerned by Chavez'
""meddling"" in the Dutch Antilles and elsewhere. While the
Dutch agreed completely on the need to restrain Chavez'
ambitions, they had no interest in needlessly provoking a
large and powerful neighbor. For that reason, Balkenende
argued that the Dutch had no choice but to deal ""subtly"" with
the Venezuelan threat.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: POLITICAL HOT POTATO:
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Ambassador Arnall briefed Balkenende on the upcoming
Parliamentary visit (septel) to the United States to review
the current state of play on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
project. Balkenende said that his government remained
committed to the project, but cautioned that it could become
a difficult issue in an election year. While some senior
PvdA leaders, he noted, understood that the JSF was ""the best
plane for the best price,"" Balkenende worried that, in the
THE HAGUE 00001782 002 OF 002
heat of an election campaign, more extreme elements would
force the party to take a hard-line position -- one it would
then not be able to change if/when the PvdA came into
government.
MUSLIM OUTREACH/DIVERSITY DIALOGUE: DUTCH SOCIETY CHANGING:
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶6. (C) Balkenende expressed strong interest in the Embassy's
plans to host a ""Diversity Dialogue"" conference bringing
Dutch and U.S. Muslim communities together in November, as
well as in its plans to host a follow-up conference on
diversity in the workplace. He pointed out that during the
Dutch EU Presidency in 2004, he had personally promoted a
European-wide discussion of ""values and norms."" Such issues
were critical given the demographic and social changes
occurring in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe.
Balkenende agreed with the Ambassador that providing real
economic opportunities for immigrants was one of the most
important steps in the integration process.
COMMENT:
--------
¶7. (C) Recently returned from vacation -- during which Dutch
papers ran photos of him sunning on a Mediterranean beach --
Balkenende appeared confident and relaxed throughout the
meeting. The devastating results of the March local
elections -- after which Balkenende's personal polls reached
historic lows -- and June's government crisis are clearly
behind him; if anything, these events appear to have
energized both Balkenende and the CDA for the difficult fight
ahead. While the CDA still lags behind PvdA in most polls,
they are gaining ground and -- unlike the PvdA -- can count
on at least one other large party -- the Liberals (VVD) -- to
help form a majority in Parliament and serve in a coalition
government. The real campaigning will not begin in earnest
for several weeks, but Balkenende appears not only up to the
challenge, but positively eager to at last have an
opportunity to get his message out to the public.
ARNALL