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Viewing cable 07PARIS257, FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07PARIS257 | 2007-01-22 17:05 | 2010-11-29 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO4762
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0257/01 0221722
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221722Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4369
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1101
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000257
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE
EAST
REF: PARIS 170
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: French NSA-equivalent Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) told the Ambassador on January 22
that "some" are calling for France to freeze plans for
establishing an international tribunal on Lebanon until next
autumn, in the hope that this delay would allow Lebanese PM
Siniora to break the political deadlock in Beirut. MGM said
that President Chirac did not espouse a delay, but suggested
(more than once) that the Lebanese themselves might request
one. Turning to Iran, he provided a somewhat unpersuasive
explanation of Chirac's rationale for contemplating the
dispatch of a high-level envoy to Tehran, saying such an
envoy might help to dispel misunderstandings of French policy
aims on a number of regional questions, and indicating that
he himself would not serve as an envoy to Tehran and neither
would FM Douste-Blazy. On Iraq, MGM said that France wanted
to see Iraq serve once again as a buffer against Iranian
expansionism, but doubted that the West had sufficient
resources to end Iranian influence in Iraq while
simultaneously solving the country's economic problems. On
Afghanistan, he reviewed the achievements of the Riga
Conference with satisfaction but said no European country was
prepared to send additional troops at this time. End summary.
Lebanon: Putting the Tribunal on Ice
------------------------------------
¶2. (S) The Ambassador hosted French NSA-equivalent Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) for breakfast on January 22. MGM
cheerfully reviewed preparations for the January 25 Lebanon
Conference, saying France would announce a contribution of
500 million euros, while Germany would pledge somewhere in
the neighborhood of 80 million euros. He observed with
pleasure that British FM Beckett was now planning to attend
(a reversal he gratefully attributed to U.S. encouragement).
The only disappointment, he said, was Russia, which would be
represented by Special Middle East Envoy Saltanov, even
though FM Lavrov's schedule could have permitted him to
attend at least the opening session.
¶3. (S) MGM said he saw little chance of resolving Lebanon's
domestic political crisis prior to the Lebanese presidential
election in November 2007. Consequently, some had raised the
idea of "putting the tribunal in the freezer" until that
time, in hopes that a delay in setting up the tribunal would
aid PM Siniora to break the political deadlock. "Of course,
we (neither he nor Chirac) are not advocating this idea," MGM
stressed at several points. Nevertheless, he continued, the
Lebanese themselves might ask the French and the U.S. to put
the tribunal on ice, in part because Siniora would need the
opposition's help in order to deliver the economic reforms
that the GOL is promising at this week's conference. The
only other option, MGM continued, would be to change the
scope of the tribunal itself -- something France found
unacceptable. When pressed on why the French were
contemplating a change in their approach to the tribunal at
this point -- especially when it was unclear that Lebanon's
opposition had the upper hand -- MGM made another (and
somewhat jumbled) reference to the need to obtain the
opposition's support for economic reform.
Chirac's Iran Envoy: Is the Idea Dead or Not?
---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Turning to recent media reports concerning President
Chirac's plans to send a high level envoy to Iran, MGM said
he was strongly reminded of how a few years ago internal USG
discussion of possible changes in Iran policy had been leaked
to the Wall Street Journal, thereby killing the proposed
discussion before it had a chance to take place. He said
Chirac's envoy proposal had suffered much the same fate after
those opposed to any change in the French approach to Iran
(MGM did not speculate on who they might be) leaked the
content of sensitive MFA-Elysee discussions to Le Monde.
(Although Le Monde approached him for comment before running
with the piece, MGM said the journalist already had "the
whole story.")
¶5. (S) MGM acknowledged that the Elysee had two concerns
about sending an envoy to Tehran. First, one could argue
(and Saudi King Abdallah did, in the strongest terms) that
sending an envoy to engage the Iranians on Lebanon would
merely consecrate Iran's role in Lebanon. (The
PARIS 00000257 002 OF 003
counterargument, MGM said, was that Iran's influence is a
fact, like it or not.) The second concern was that the
Iranians might try to parley the overture into an invitation
to attend the January 25 Lebanon Conference. "But even if
they had asked, we weren't going to invite them," MGM assured
the Ambassador.
¶6. (S) As for the virtues of engaging with Tehran, MGM argued
that it would be useful to dispel Iranian misperceptions of
France's policy aims in the Middle East without engaging in a
debate on those aims. Hence, Chirac had mulled the
possibility of arming his envoy with a letter to Supreme
Leader Khamenei, which would spell out France's position on
Israel (i.e., that it has a right to exist), on UNSCR 1701
(that all states are obligated to work toward its full
implementation), and on Iran's need to promote regional
stability (code for stop interfering in Iraq). In addition,
Chirac and his advisors reasoned that an envoy's visit might
strengthen the hand of President Ahmadinejad's critics.
¶7. (S) MGM stressed that the idea of sending Foreign Minister
Douste-Blazy was no longer an option, not only because of the
Le Monde leak but also because of vehement opposition from
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. MGM also made it clear that he
himself would not be an envoy to Tehran, given the likelihood
that the Iranians would try to oblige him to see President
Ahmadinejad (which neither Chirac nor his advisers will do,
given Ahmadinejad's public declarations on Israel). However,
MGM did not categorically exclude the possibility that Chirac
would not send someone else (e.g., Jean-Claude Cousseran) as
an envoy.
UNIFIL: A Solution on Drones?
-----------------------------
¶8. (S) MGM indicated that France was searching for a solution
to the problem of operating UAVs (i.e., "drones") over
southern Lebanon in the wake of recent statements by
Hizballah claiming that France would share with Israel any
intelligence collected by the drones. MGM said France would
not allow Hizballah to draw red-lines impinging upon the
operations of French peacekeepers; Hizballah had attempted
this once before with respect to the deployment of Leclerc
tanks, and the French had deployed the tanks anyway.
However, he confirmed a difference of opinion between the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs: the military was
determined to operate the drones (which were shipped to
UNIFIL at the request of UNDPKO), whereas the diplomats
advised caution. Consequently, MGM said the French were
leaning towards a "demonstration flight" held in the presence
of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces with "maximum
transparency" so that it would be clear to the Lebanese
public that the UAV flights would not be used as a source of
intelligence for Israel. The final decision, he emphasized,
would only be made by Chirac himself.
¶9. (S) Noting that on the ground cooperation between Lebanese
civilians living in UNIFIL's area of operations and French
peacekeepers ended overnight following FM Douste-Blazy's
ill-considered declaration that Hizballah was an enemy to
France, MGM said France "must walk a fine line" while not
allowing Hizballah to dictate terms to UNIFIL. If necessary,
France could reinforce its military presence by deploying the
second of two battalions pledged to UNIFIL last year. MGM
confirmed that in February, the French would conduct a
6-month review of their participation in UNIFIL. While he
foresaw no change in France's participation as a result of
this review, he conceded that any attack against French
peacekeepers would likely lead to further evaluation of
France's role. Moreover, he admitted that the French are
deeply concerned that Hizballah might attempt to kidnap
French peacekeepers in the run-up to the French presidential
elections this Spring.
Syria
-----
¶10. (S) Noting ruefully that a velvet revolution does not
appear to be in prospect any time soon in Damascus, MGM
expressed mild concern over the future of France's Syria
policy once Chirac leaves office. "Any new government will
be tempted to think that talking to the Syrians is the
answer," he said, adding that while Socialist Party candidate
Segolene Royal had indicated her agreement with the general
thrust of current French policy, Interior Minister Sarkozy
remained somewhat vague on the issue. MGM noted that FM
Muallim has summoned the French ambassador in Damascus to a
PARIS 00000257 003 OF 003
meeting on January 25, in what the French were regarding as a
sign of Syrian anxiety about the success of the International
Conference for Lebanon.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶11. (S) MGM expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the
NATO Summit in Riga, and, looking ahead to the informal
ministerial on January 26, he emphasized that no EU country
was prepared to send additional troops to Afghanistan at this
time. However, he said there was a willingness to undertake
further consultation on how to combine civil/military
objectives in Afghanistan (e.g., counternarcotics). While
offering a justification for France's proposed contact group,
MGM did no press the point.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON