Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AR
ASEC
AEMR
AORC
AJ
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AE
AU
AFIN
AX
AMED
ADCO
AG
AODE
APER
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AM
AL
ASIG
ABLD
ABUD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
AGMT
ATRN
CO
CH
COUNTER
CDG
CI
CU
CVIS
CIS
CA
CBW
CF
CLINTON
CM
CASC
CMGT
CN
CE
CJAN
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CG
CS
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CV
CAN
ECON
ETTC
ELN
EPET
ENRG
EFIN
EAID
EINV
EG
EWWT
ELAB
EUN
EU
EAIR
ETRD
ECPS
ER
EINT
EIND
EAGR
EMIN
ELTN
EFIS
EI
EN
ES
EC
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENVR
ENIV
EZ
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ECA
ET
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IR
IS
IAEA
IZ
IT
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
IN
IO
ID
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
IIP
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INRB
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
KNNP
KDEM
KIRF
KWMN
KPAL
KPAO
KGHG
KN
KS
KJUS
KDRG
KSCA
KIPR
KHLS
KGIC
KRAD
KCRM
KCOR
KE
KSPR
KG
KZ
KTFN
KISL
KTIA
KHIV
KWBG
KACT
KPRP
KU
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KV
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KTIP
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KMCA
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KVPR
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBIO
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KHDP
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
KCOM
KDEV
MOPS
MX
MNUC
MEPP
MARR
MTCRE
MK
MTRE
MASS
MU
MCAP
ML
MO
MP
MA
MY
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASC
MASSMNUC
MPOS
MZ
MOPPS
MAPP
MG
MCC
OREP
ODIP
OTRA
OVIP
OSCE
OPRC
OAS
OFDP
OIIP
OPIC
OPDC
OEXC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PREL
PTER
PINR
PINS
PARM
PHUM
PARMS
PREF
PBTS
PK
PHSA
PROP
PE
PO
PA
PM
PMIL
PL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
PRAM
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PGOF
SMIG
SNAR
SOCI
SENV
SO
SP
SW
SHUM
SR
SCUL
SY
SA
SF
SZ
SU
SL
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
SN
SG
UK
UNGA
UP
UNSC
UZ
UN
UY
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNO
UNEP
UG
US
USTR
UNHCR
UNMIK
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08TRIPOLI480, BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TRIPOLI480.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08TRIPOLI480 | 2008-06-18 12:12 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/ |
VZCZCXRO2277
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0480/01 1701245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 181245Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3556
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4062
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000480
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
EO 12958 DECL: 6/18/2018
TAGS ECON, EINV, KBCT, PGOV, UK, LY
SUBJECT: BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF
PROMINENT LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN
REF: A) TRIPOLI 349, B) 07 TRIPOLI 297
TRIPOLI 00000480 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In Libya, major business deals are both political and personal. The ongoing drama surrounding efforts by the U.K. government and investors to keep open the Marks & Spencer retail store in Tripoli, and a campaign by some GOL officials to close it, affords a prime example. Libyan officials at the highest levels have publicly attacked a major European retailer - damaging bilateral ties with the U.K. in the process - largely due to a personal grievance between the Prime Minister and the Libyan businessman at the center of the deal. The fate of the store and the businessman are closely intertwined, and the ensuing test of wills reportedly has the potential to end in violence. The U.K. Embassy, which is closely involved, has flatly told us they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End Summary.
THE TRAVAILS OF “MARKS & SPARKS” CONTINUE
¶2. (C) UK retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S), affectionately referred to in the U.K. as “Marks & Sparks”, opened a location in Tripoli in April that has since been a magnet for controversy (ref A). The store has been closed by Libyan authorities on at least two occasions, and there is a very good chance that it will be shut permanently in coming months. According to a local business contact with good second-hand knowledge of the situation, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi’s office has become directly involved in the matter, and has directed that the franchise either be sold to unspecified government officials, or suffer an immediate freeze on further import of stock and be closed permanently by year’s end. M&S employees have received close scrutiny by Libyan security officials, who have been used as a strongarm adjunct in this political play; employees were all taken in for a second round of questioning in early June.
GOL ADOPTS REPUGNANT ANTI-SEMITIC TACTICS
¶3. (C) The Libyan government’s public narrative has taken the form of persistent anti-Semitic rhetoric alleging that the company is a “Zionist entity” with Jewish origins that supports Israel and “the killing of Palestinians”. A strongly-worded statement released to Libyan media outlets in early June by the General Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (which ostensibly represents all private businesses in Libya, both Libyan and foreign) condemned the fact that the store was still open and called for its permanent closure. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶4. (C) The Chamber also voiced its disapproval of a recent stop at the M&S store by the visiting U.K. Trade Minister. According to the statement, the visit violated the Libyan people’s sensibilities, as it fell “on the eve of al-Nakba” (i.e., the date of the Israeli military victory in 1948 that created the modern state of Israel). The U.K. Commercial Counselor told us that M&S had been removed in 2007 from the Arab League’s list of companies to be boycotted because of Jewish ownership or Israeli equities, and that both M&S and the U.K. Embassy had done careful vetting with the GOL before the Tripoli store opened in an attempt to preclude any related complications.
HOW DID IT COME TO THIS?
¶5. (C) In typical fashion, while the GOL’s public criticism has comprised pseudo-populist rhetoric against “the forces of Zionism”, the crux of the matter is in fact about personal relations and politics. The primary Libyan agent for the Marks & Spencer franchise in Libya is well-known businessman XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX was arrested in March 2007 as part of a government crack-down on several prominent businesspeople accused of illegally engaging in monopolistic business practices (ref B). He has since been subject to a travel ban on several occasions, most recently in April-May. His impressive personal fortune, prominent public profile and dominance over several categories of consumer goods in Libya gall government insiders and state-supported “men of commerce”. His acrimonious relationship with Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi is well-known - as reported ref B, he derisively referred to al-Mahmoudi as “that
TRIPOLI 00000480 002.2 OF 002
man” in a meeting of the Libyan Businessmens’ Council to discuss private sector reform. Another member of Libya’s business elite described XXXXXXXXXXXX as “dangerously candid”, noting that he does not mask his general disdain for the GOL and its officials.
AND HOW DOES IT END?
¶6. (C) According to a well-placed embassy XXXXXXXXXXXX contact, there is a genuine threat that state security officials may visit personal harm on XXXXXXXXXXXX (and others like him) at the direction of “old guard” regime figures. XXXXXXXXXXXX Telling our contact XXXXXXXXXXXX that “in the old days we would just arrest him”, they offered that they would instead “clip him down to nothing” by dismantling his business empire piecemeal and undertaking a campaign to diminish his business influence. They then noted darkly that if those methods proved insufficient, they would see to it that XXXXXXXXXXXX was involved in a fatal car accident.
¶7. (C) Comment: The ongoing drama of M&S illustrates the confluence of the personal and the political in a commercial climate in which senior regime officials have a direct stake in virtually anything worth owning or selling. The fact that a small number of business elites like XXXXXXXXXXXX have managed to amass considerable fortunes without paying the tithe that senior regime officials consider to be their due rankles greatly. PM al-Mahmoudi’s attack on M&S and XXXXXXXXXXXX, motivated as far as most observers can tell solely by personal animus, has created friction with the U.K. and prompted questions by Libyan and foreign concerns about the extent to which the business and investment climate has actually improved. Some Libyan observers have expressed concern that M&S was allowed to open in the first place if the government’s position was that it was a “Jewish-owned company” and therefore should not be allowed to operate in Libya. A prominent business contact told us that the travails of M&S served as a cautionary tale about the potential consequences for investors of the sheer lack of coordination and fecklessness in the GOL. The public and ham-fisted manner in which the GOL is pursuing this matter has ensured that any action taken against M&S and/or XXXXXXXXXXXX will quickly become common knowledge, which may give the GOL pause before it acts too rashly against either. U.K. Emboffs have flatly told us that they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End comment. STEVENS