Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AR
ASEC
AEMR
AORC
AJ
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AE
AU
AFIN
AX
AMED
ADCO
AG
AODE
APER
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AM
AL
ASIG
ABLD
ABUD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
AGMT
ATRN
CO
CH
COUNTER
CDG
CI
CU
CVIS
CIS
CA
CBW
CF
CLINTON
CM
CASC
CMGT
CN
CE
CJAN
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CG
CS
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CV
CAN
ECON
ETTC
ELN
EPET
ENRG
EFIN
EAID
EINV
EG
EWWT
ELAB
EUN
EU
EAIR
ETRD
ECPS
ER
EINT
EIND
EAGR
EMIN
ELTN
EFIS
EI
EN
ES
EC
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENVR
ENIV
EZ
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ECA
ET
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IR
IS
IAEA
IZ
IT
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
IN
IO
ID
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
IIP
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INRB
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
KNNP
KDEM
KIRF
KWMN
KPAL
KPAO
KGHG
KN
KS
KJUS
KDRG
KSCA
KIPR
KHLS
KGIC
KRAD
KCRM
KCOR
KE
KSPR
KG
KZ
KTFN
KISL
KTIA
KHIV
KWBG
KACT
KPRP
KU
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KV
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KTIP
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KMCA
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KVPR
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBIO
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KHDP
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
KCOM
KDEV
MOPS
MX
MNUC
MEPP
MARR
MTCRE
MK
MTRE
MASS
MU
MCAP
ML
MO
MP
MA
MY
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASC
MASSMNUC
MPOS
MZ
MOPPS
MAPP
MG
MCC
OREP
ODIP
OTRA
OVIP
OSCE
OPRC
OAS
OFDP
OIIP
OPIC
OPDC
OEXC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PREL
PTER
PINR
PINS
PARM
PHUM
PARMS
PREF
PBTS
PK
PHSA
PROP
PE
PO
PA
PM
PMIL
PL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
PRAM
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PGOF
SMIG
SNAR
SOCI
SENV
SO
SP
SW
SHUM
SR
SCUL
SY
SA
SF
SZ
SU
SL
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
SN
SG
UK
UNGA
UP
UNSC
UZ
UN
UY
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNO
UNEP
UG
US
USTR
UNHCR
UNMIK
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08BARCELONA76, DIVERGENT PARTY CONVENTIONS UNITE CATALAN PARTIES
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BARCELONA76.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08BARCELONA76 | 2008-08-11 11:11 | 2010-12-15 21:09 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Barcelona |
VZCZCXRO7731
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHLA #0076/01 2241101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111101Z AUG 08
FM AMCONSUL BARCELONA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1010
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0970
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 1178
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BARCELONA 000076
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE (ESAMSON)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: DIVERGENT PARTY CONVENTIONS UNITE CATALAN PARTIES
BARCELONA 00000076 001.2 OF 003
SUMMARY
¶1. (SBU) "We love you a lot, Mr. Zapatero, but we love Catalonia
even more," declared Generalitat and PSC president Jose at the
close of the PSC eleventh party congress. For the PSC,
Montilla's words were especially poignant, a sign that their
responsibilities of governing Catalonia would take some priority
over supporting their co-religionists in Madrid. Substantial
policy differences between the PSC and the PSOE also emerged as
the Catalans refused to follow PSOE's sharp turn to the left.
This new push to claim the center reflects the unusual electoral
situation for the PSC, which does not battle for votes with the
Popular Party of Catalonia (PPC), but with nationalist,
center-right coalition Convergence and Union (CiU). At their
party convention the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC),
the majority party of CiU, emphasized a "big tent" form of
nationalism that seeks to welcome the entire nationalist
spectrum, from moderates who favor the status quo to those who
favor outright independence. The Republican Left (ERC), the
other independence party, one of PSC's coalition partners in the
tripartite government (Govern), attempted to address why it has
lost so many votes since 2006. The ultimate winner of a four-way
presidential race ran on a "stay the course" platform, but with
a bare plurality, new president Joan Puigcercos will not lead
with a mandate and will have to carefully balance the demands of
the ERC's partners and his intra-party critics. The convention
of the PPC (PPC) was extremely contentious, as their
newly-elected president was practically forced upon them by the
national leadership. The PPC's major problem is that many
Catalans perceive them to be actively undermining Catalonia's
interests, hardly a winning strategy in a region with a strong
national spirit.
¶2. (SBU) While Catalan parties used the summer to sort out
internal issues and re-position themselves vis-a-vis each other,
this fall will see them work together to some degree to wrest
even more autonomy from Madrid. First, the PSOE-led Spanish
government and the PSC-led Generalitat are negotiating the terms
of a new system for financing the Catalan government. Catalonia
regularly provides more revenue to the central government than
it receives in services; thus, all the parties except for the
PPC, are in favor of receiving more money from the central
government. The other point of contention continues to be
implementation of the Estatut (Statute) governing relations
between Catalonia and Madrid. Approved via referendum in 2006,
the Estatut granted increased powers to the Generalitat,
including its own police force. It was, however, immediately
challenged in the Constitutional Tribunal (TC), Spain's highest
constitutional authority. The TC is expected to issue a final
ruling on the Estatut this fall. In their conventions, the
parties called on the TC to keep the Estatut intact, though they
have not outlined concrete plans in the event it receives a
negative ruling. END SUMMARY
PSC: Catalonia First
¶3. (SBU) At its party congress this summer, the Socialist Party
of Catalonia (PSC), long accused by the nationalist parties of
putting PSOE ahead of Catalonia, struck an independent tone from
PSOE in hopes of shoring up support. On the ideological front,
the PSC's centrist move was mainly intended to seize the center
from CiU. In their platform, the PSC did not call for wider
access to abortion, support for euthanasia, nor removal of
religious symbols from official ceremonies and schools, which
were all moves PSOE made just weeks before. However, this was
not just a political move, as historically the PSC has had a
less confrontational attitude with the Catholic Church in
Catalonia than PSOE does with the wider Spanish Church. This
difference is attributed to the close relationship the Catalan
Socialists have with the progressive sections of the Catalan
Church, which date back to the Franco era, as well as the
overall reputation for moderation that the Catalan bishops have.
While the PSC's newfound moderate attitude is an important
development for the party, more surprising is its more
confrontational stance with PSOE. Vowing that they would
aggressively pursue a fairer financing scheme for Catalonia, the
PSC seeks to neutralize one of CiU's most effective weapons
against them. At the same time, however, the PSC realizes that
they must balance demands from PSOE and Catalonia. Although the
PSC is technically an independent party, it has sat with PSOE in
the same parliamentary group in the Congress of Deputies. While
some sections of the party seek for it to have its own group,
the leadership realizes that this, and other 'separatist'
actions can damage both parties. If PSC completely breaks away,
PSOE would have to form a Catalan federation of its own, the way
it operates in the rest of Spain, and something it has not had
since 1978. This would most likely lead to the defeat of both
parties at the national and regional levels. Thus, the PSC seeks
BARCELONA 00000076 002.2 OF 003
balance in order to maintain power both in Catalonia, and with
PSOE in Madrid.
ERC: Where Do We Go From Here?
¶4. (SBU) The leftist, independence party, the ERC scored
surprising electoral victories in the early part of the decade,
enabling it to join the PSC-led coalition in the Govern in 2003
and 2006. Since then, however, the ERC has suffered a large drop
in votes, going from 8 seats to 3 in the Congress of Deputies
after the March 2008 elections. After this defeat, party
president, Josep Lluis Carod Rovira resigned that office, though
he remained Vice President of the Generalitat. The internal
struggle to replace him was a proxy battle over the future
direction of a party seeking to regain its popularity.
¶5. (SBU) A bitter 4-way race for the top two party positions,
evolved, pitting two "stay-the-course" tickets against two "new
direction" tickets. The winners, Joan Puigcercos for president
and Joan Ridao for general secretary, won on a platform to
largely continue the party's current policies, albeit their low
share of the rank-and-file's vote (37.2% and 37.5% respectively)
was not a solid endorsement of their views. Indeed, the
presidential runner-up, Joan Carretero, campaigned as a harsh
critic of both Carod and Puigcercos' policies, especially in
regards to the party's relation with the PSC. Many in the ERC
feel the Socialists compromised too much with Madrid over the
Estatut, so much so that the ERC called for a 'no' vote on the
referendum. In dealing with these critical factions, Puigcercos
has vowed to mark three lines the Govern cannot cross without
losing the ERC's support. These are: unwavering support for the
current Estatut; promotion of Catalan language and culture,
including having Catalonia's 1= million new arrivals learn
Catalan; and a new finance regime that allocates more tax
revenue for Catalonia. To further appease intra-party critics,
Puigcercos said he will ask President Montilla for a formal
meeting between the tripartite partners to "evaluate the
accomplishments" of the coalition. It is clear that Puigcercos
will have to carefully balance the demands from both his
coalition partners and critics inside the party. Failure to do
so could lead to the dissolution of the Govern and even harder
times for the ERC.
ICV: A Third, But Important, Wheel
¶6. (SBU) The third member of the tripartite coalition, also
known as the Entesa Catalana de Progres, the ICV, did not hold a
convention this summer, opting instead to convene next year. The
ICV, while not independence-minded, desires more power for
Catalonia, and largely supports the Socialists on most issues.
However as a Green party, they are stern critics of the PSC's
environmental policies. ICV leader and Catalan Councilor for the
Interior, Joan Saura, often tries to maintain balance between
the PSC and ERC.
CDC: Fighting an Uphill Battle
¶7. (SBU) CDC, the majority party of CiU, has focused on
recovering the presidency of the Generalitat since they were
unable to win a majority in 2006. CDC's convention this summer
underlined a party strategy that will mostly continue its
current policies with minor adjustments. Among these slight
tweaks was the adoption of party leader Artur Mas's pet project
of "the great house Catalan-ism" (la casa gran del catalanisme).
It is an attempt to make the party appear more welcoming of the
different strands of Catalan nationalism, thus trying to expand
its electorate and regaining a majority in the Generalitat. The
party's platform does not explicitly call for independence,
though it does emphasize Catalonia's right to self-determination
and vaguely foresees Catalonia as a free and sovereign state in
21st century Europe. CiU will also have a seat at the
negotiating table this summer and fall as the regional and
national governments wrangle over a new financing system.
¶8. (SBU) In a perennial move, the CDC reiterated its desire to
completely merge with rightist Democratic Union of Catalonia
(UDC) into a single party, which UDC, again, flatly refused,
although it has not held a convention this summer. However, the
two will continue as partners in CiU. The CDC also opted for
more inclusion of the rank-and-file in decision-making, stating
that the executive committee will consult with the membership on
those matters of vital political transcendence, but their
opinion will not be binding. Long accustomed to being perceived
as the socially centrist choice among Catalan parties, it is not
yet clear how the CDC will respond to the PSC's move to the
middle.
PPC: Down but Not Quite Out
BARCELONA 00000076 003.2 OF 003
¶9. (SBU) The PPC, the Popular Party's Catalan subsidiary, is
plagued by the same problems faced by the national party:
unpopular leaders pushing unpopular ideas. For example, party
members arrived at their convention to find that national PP
president, Mariano Rajoy, had unilaterally imposed a last-minute
candidate for PPC president, Alicia Sanchez-Camacho, a senator
from Girona. Rajoy also dispatched the new PP Secretary for
Organization, Ana Mato to persuade the other candidates, bitter
rivals Alberto Fernanez-Dmaz and Daniel Sirera to drop their
bids. Still, a fourth candidate, Montserrat Nebrera, refused to
end her candidacy, and in the final vote, lost to
Sanchez-Camacho by a slim 53%-47% vote.
¶10. (SBU) Still, unpopular leaders are not the PPC's only
obstacle to winning elections. In 2006, the PP opposed the
Estatut for the complete opposite reason as the ERC; they
claimed it gave too much autonomy to Catalonia. This is but one
instance in which the PP was thought by most Catalans to be
working against Catalonia's interests. In a region dominated by
fervent nationalists, undermining Catalonia is hardly a winning
strategy. If the entire goal of a political party is to win
elections, the PPC has to drastically reform the way it does
business if it ever hopes to govern Catalonia.
COMMENT
¶11. (SBU) As in many other ways, Catalan politics differ
markedly from the rest of Spain, a product of the strong Catalan
national spirit that has seen a resurgence in the past three
decades of democracy. Still, despite this deep-seated
nationalism, less than a third of Catalans support full
independence from Spain. In Barcelona, the beating heart of
Catalan politics and economy, support is even lower. It is
difficult to imagine Spain without Catalonia and impossible to
imagine Catalonia without Barcelona. Why, then, are the Catalan
parties strongly advancing even more autonomy? Why are the
Catalan Socialists pushing against PSOE, ranking "Catalan" over
"socialist"? The answer is that while the vast majority of
Catalans do not want independence, they do want respect from the
rest of Spain. They want recognition of the importance of the
region in the Spanish context - that they pay more into the
system than they get out of it, that they are, at least in their
own minds, the hardest working, most productive, and most
efficient. We also believe they want acceptance of Catalonia as
a people with a different "story", much like the Basques or the
Galicians, that make them unique in Spain. And recent history
indicates that Madrid is ready to give them that respect, as the
development of the Estatut showed. The central government
voluntarily limited its power over the region, allowing the
Catalans to police and educate themselves. Now, despite much
bickering and hand wringing on all sides, most signs point to a
new financing system that allows them to better fund themselves.
¶12. (SBU) Since presiding over the Generalitat, the PSC has
fully acknowledged that this desire for respect exists, and that
to keep power, they must accommodate it. However, as the next
regional elections (scheduled for 2010) approach, the PSC will
have to strike careful balances, not only between PSOE and
Catalonia, but between its left flank and the need to win the
center. To some extent, the tripartite alliance is a real boon,
as the PSC's partners, the ERC and ICV, will mostly likely pick
up the leftist votes lost by the Socialists' attempt at the
middle. This complicates things enormously for the CiU, which
lacks a similar arrangement on the right. The PPC, though an
occasional ally in the past, is so fraught with its own problems
that it can provide little support; even should both parties
desire it. In this light, the CiU's new policy of big-tent
nationalism comes across as an aggressive electoral strategy to
woo the staunch independents of the ERC, and win an absolute
majority. In addition to placing nationalism at the forefront,
the CiU can also hope that Spain's current economic woes,
expected to last well into 2009, tarnish the incumbent
Socialists enough to win. Indeed it may be that this is CiU's
best hope, since the resolution of the Estatut and successful
negotiations for a new finance system may fulfill Catalonia's
desire for greater respect. END COMMENT
ROBINSON