VZCZCXRO6676
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0030/01 0141456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 141456Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4323
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0159
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4846

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), USUN FOR GOLDBERGER, GERMAIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL UN KPAO ASEC IS LY EG
SUBJECT: LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA  REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988, B) 08 TRIPOLI 984, C) TRIPOLI 005  TRIPOLI 00000030  001.2 OF 003   

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting of senior regime figures, Muammar al-Qadhafi dismissed UNSCR 1860 as ineffectual, argued that further action on Gaza through UN channels would be "meaningless", minimized the chance that the upcoming Arab League ministerial on Gaza would be helpful and said Libya must increase its unilateral efforts to assist Gazans.  The meeting came on the heels of al-Qadhafi's public statement calling on Arab states to allow volunteers to fight alongside the Palestinians.  Libya has sent humanitarian supplies (food, medical supplies, medicine, ambulances) to Sinai, has a team of doctors and logistics coordinators on the ground there, and has evacuated 8-10 wounded Gazans to Libya for treatment.  A quasi-governmental organization headed by Muammar al-Qadhafi's daughter asked the UN to help facilitate the transfer to Libya of 1,000 Palestinian children for the duration of the fighting (the UN demurred).  Protests against diplomatic missions - the UN headquarters, Egyptian Embassy and Mauritanian Embassy have all been targeted - continue as the regime tries to maintain a balance between public demonstrations of solidarity with Palestinians and private concern that its efforts on Gaza not come at too high a diplomatic cost.  The regime's media efforts have helped stir public reaction, leaving it less room to maneuver as events in Gaza wear on.  End comment  

AL-QADHAFI: UN AND AL CHANNELS "MEANINGLESS"; LIBYA MUST GO IT ALONE  

¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told P/E Chief on January 12 that Muammar al-Qadhafi chaired a meeting of senior regime figures, including representatives of the NSC, MFA, General People's Congress and security organizations, on/about the evening of January 10.  The meeting came shortly after a statement attributed to al-Qadhafi appeared on the state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency calling for Arab states to  " ... open the door for volunteers to fight alongside the Palestinians". (Note: We have seen no calls to date for Libyans to travel to Gaza to fight.  End note.)  xxxxxxxxxxxx, who attended the meeting. (Note: xxxxxxxxxxxx is the son of senior regime figure xxxxxxxxxxxx and is increasingly an important figure in his own right.  A confidante of both Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Muatassim al-Qadhafi, he travels regularly with Muammar al-Qadhafi xxxxxxxxxxxx and has demonstrated an ability to work on sensitive issues such as refugee resettlement under the auspices of his quasi-governmental organization, the International Organization for Peace, Care and Relief.  End note.)  

¶3. (C) Al-Qadhafi told the group that the international community's unwillingness to pressure Israel had made UNSCR 1860 ineffectual, and said further action through the UN would be "meaningless".  He dismissed the likelihood that the upcoming Arab League (AL) emergency ministerial on Gaza would help matters, arguing that the Arab reaction to events in Gaza had, from Libya's perspective, been as feckless as that of the rest of the international community. (Note: In recent public remarks covered in Libyan press, al-Qadhafi called Arabs' reaction to date "cowardly".  End note.) Al-Qadhafi's conclusion was that Libya must increase its unilateral efforts to assist Palestinians in Gaza.  He directed a "surge" in Libya's humanitarian shipments to Gaza and tasked several trusted figures, including xxxxxxxxxxxx, to manage those efforts.  

EGYPT REPORTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT IMAGE  

¶4. (C)  xxxxxxxxxxxx told xxxxxxxxxxxx that Libya would send an "air convoy" of two to three aircraft with humanitarian supplies to el-Arrish on/about January 13.  Unusually, xxxxxxxxxxxx planned to accompany the convoy along with a press gaggle, underscoring the regime's concern that its efforts be properly trumpeted. xxxxxxxxxxxx urged xxxxxxxxxxxx to secure landing clearances from Egypt before dispatching the aircraft to avoid repeating the situation in late December, when a Libyan aircraft was initially denied permission to land at el-Arrish.  xxxxxxxxxxxx said UN officials were having a hard time securing permission from Egyptian authorities to establish a presence near the Rafah crossing.  Citing an email from the UN's ResRep in Cairo, al-Wash said Egyptian First Lady xxxxxxxxxxxx had effectively demanded prominent publicity for the Mubarak family's role as benefactors of Palestinians in Gaza in exchange for providing security clearances for World Food Program and other UN officials to establish a presence near Rafah and other crossing points into Gaza.  In an email message xxxxxxxxxxxx showed to us, the UN ResRep in Egypt complained that some elements of the GOE were more concerned about appearances than facilitating humanitarian aid flows. (Note: xxxxxxxxxxxx stressed that the same was true of the GOL. End note.)  Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdel Halim told Poloff that Egypt's initial reticence was due as much to the nature of  TRIPOLI 00000030  002.2 OF 003   Libya's shipments as it was with the delivery mechanism. Contrasting Libya's attempt to airlift flour and sugar along with "three tons of medical supplies" with Egypt's offer of over 300 tons and several mobile hospital units, Abdel Halim complained that Libya was detracting from serious aid work by demanding its aid get priority delivery.   

MFA SAYS LIBYAN HUMANITARIAN SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN "CONTINUOUS"  

¶5. (C) Separately, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs Muhammad Taher Siala told the Ambassador on January 13 that Libyan shipments of humanitarian relief to Gaza since the beginning of violence had been "continuous".  Conceding that delivering humanitarian supplies had been difficult, he said cooperation with Egypt had been "very good". (Note: We'd contrast that with the daily GOL-orchestrated demonstrations against the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli, which at one point was attacked by 700 rock-throwing protestors.  End note.)  The GOL has a team on the ground in the Sinai to help coordinate delivery of humanitarian supplies (food, medicine, medicial supplies and ambulances) sent by Libya, and had secured a large warehouse in el-Arrish to store supplies until they could be delivered. (Note: The xxxxxxxxxxxx citing his conversation with xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the GOL had not/not secured a warehouse and that supplies sent by Libya were being stored in an open-air soccer stadium and suffered rain damage. End note.)  Stressing that most of the aid from Libya had been "privately collected" and that the GOL was primarily covering "freight costs" for transportation of same, Siala also said cash collections as of January 12 totaled some 10 million dollars.  Individuals bearing collection boxes emblazoned with Palestinian flags have been a fixture on Tripoli's main throughfares for the past week.  The GOL recently sent two ships to Sinai - one with 2,000 tons of supplies, the other with 4,000 tons - and he claimed that the GOL had staged 20-25 flights of supplies as well. (Note: xxxxxxxxxxxx put actual Libyan air deliveries at about half that.  End note.)  

¶6. (C) Stressing the difficulty of using the Rafah crossing, which was primarily being used to facilitate the movement of people, Siala said most of the Libyan humanitarian supplies had been sent into Gaza through "other corridors" (NFI).  Libya is also running medical evacuation flights, bringing critically wounded Gazans to Libya for treatment. (Note: The GOL has used new air ambulances manufactured by U.S. companies Cessna and Bell, which it purchased last year. End note.) Siala said the GOL had experienced some difficulty securing clearances for medevac flights, which he attributed to the GOE's "embarrassment" that Egypt was unable to accommodate all of the wounded Palestinians in Egyptian hospitals.  He said the GOL had so far transported 8-10 individuals to Libya for treatment.  

REGIME SOLICITS UN'S HELP IN TRANSPORTING 1,000 PALESTINIAN CHILDREN TO LIBYA; PROTESTS CONTINUE  

¶7. (C)  UN Resident Representative (ResRep) Brian Gleeson told the Ambassador January 12 that the Waatesimu Organization, headed by Aisha al-Qadhafi (daughter of Muammar al-Qadhafi), had requested the UN's assistance in transporting 1,000 Palestinian children from Gaza to Libya for the duration of the conflict. Citing concerns about whether the children would be permitted to return after fighting had stopped, Gleeson said the UN had demurred.   He said the UN headquarters building had seen daily demontrations against events in Gaza during the past week.  Some protests, most recently by a crowd of about 150 people on January 9, had targeted the UN building; others were target of opportunity events staged by protestors en route to Algiers Square and the Egyptian Embassy, where the largest Gaza-related protests in Tripoli have taken place so far.  A group of several hundred schoolchildren paused outside the UN building on January 8.  Protestors had presented three different letters to the UN Secretary General from Libyan organizations so far.  Responding to the Ambassador's question as to why the UN would be targeted, Gleeson said Libyans equate the UN organization with the UNSC, which is perceived to be a tool of the U.S.  He noted that a number of Libyans had directed remarks to his driver and other UN staff disparaging the UN's perceived role as a facilitator of ongoing violence in Gaza.  Separately, demonstrations have continued against the Egyptian Embassy and the Sudanese Cultural Attache told us the Mauritanian Embassy had been the subject of a protest during the past week as well that caused some damage (NFI).  

¶8. (C) Gleeson characterized GOL security forces' management of the protests as "very good", noting that in many cases national police and other security officials were in place before demonstrators arrived (suggesting a high degree of orchestration).  In the few instances in which crowds had arrived before police, Gleeson and his security officer had been able to quickly muster GOL security forces via telephone calls  TRIPOLI 00000030  003.2 OF 003   to key GOL interlocutors.  Protestors had attempted to erect a tent in the small square in front of the UN building; however, national police had quickly put an end to the effort.  

¶9. (C) Comment: The high-profile efforts to send humanitarian supplies and carefully managed (so far) demonstrations in Tripoli reflect the regime's effort to strike a balance between public demonstrations of solidarity with Palestinians and private concern that its efforts on Gaza not come at too high a diplomatic cost.  While willing to privately concede that Egypt has been fairly cooperative in facilitating flows of humanitarian aid from Libya, the regime has continued to orchestrate demonstrations against the Egyptian Embassy and other lesser lights of the diplomatic firmament (Mauritania, for instance), in part because demonstrations against the U.S. and other missions are a more risky enterprise.  That said, the regime's media efforts have helped stir public reaction, leaving it less room to maneuver as events in Gaza wear on.  End comment. 
CRETZ