Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AR
ASEC
AEMR
AORC
AJ
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AE
AU
AFIN
AX
AMED
ADCO
AG
AODE
APER
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AM
AL
ASIG
ABLD
ABUD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
AGMT
ATRN
CO
CH
COUNTER
CDG
CI
CU
CVIS
CIS
CA
CBW
CF
CLINTON
CM
CASC
CMGT
CN
CE
CJAN
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CG
CS
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CV
CAN
ECON
ETTC
ELN
EPET
ENRG
EFIN
EAID
EINV
EG
EWWT
ELAB
EUN
EU
EAIR
ETRD
ECPS
ER
EINT
EIND
EAGR
EMIN
ELTN
EFIS
EI
EN
ES
EC
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENVR
ENIV
EZ
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ECA
ET
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IR
IS
IAEA
IZ
IT
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
IN
IO
ID
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
IIP
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INRB
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
KNNP
KDEM
KIRF
KWMN
KPAL
KPAO
KGHG
KN
KS
KJUS
KDRG
KSCA
KIPR
KHLS
KGIC
KRAD
KCRM
KCOR
KE
KSPR
KG
KZ
KTFN
KISL
KTIA
KHIV
KWBG
KACT
KPRP
KU
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KV
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KTIP
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KMCA
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KVPR
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBIO
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KHDP
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
KCOM
KDEV
MOPS
MX
MNUC
MEPP
MARR
MTCRE
MK
MTRE
MASS
MU
MCAP
ML
MO
MP
MA
MY
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASC
MASSMNUC
MPOS
MZ
MOPPS
MAPP
MG
MCC
OREP
ODIP
OTRA
OVIP
OSCE
OPRC
OAS
OFDP
OIIP
OPIC
OPDC
OEXC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PREL
PTER
PINR
PINS
PARM
PHUM
PARMS
PREF
PBTS
PK
PHSA
PROP
PE
PO
PA
PM
PMIL
PL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
PRAM
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PGOF
SMIG
SNAR
SOCI
SENV
SO
SP
SW
SHUM
SR
SCUL
SY
SA
SF
SZ
SU
SL
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
SN
SG
UK
UNGA
UP
UNSC
UZ
UN
UY
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNO
UNEP
UG
US
USTR
UNHCR
UNMIK
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV422, IDF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES GAZA OPERATION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TELAVIV422.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TELAVIV422 | 2009-02-19 14:02 | 2011-02-09 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #0422/01 0501453
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191453Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0573
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5511
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3557
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 1672
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5873
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2080
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1445
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000422
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PINR MASS MOPS EG KWBG IS
SUBJECT: IDF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES GAZA OPERATION
CAST LEAD AND U.S.-EGYPTIAN ROLES TO SLOW SMUGGLING TO HAMAS REF: A. TEL AVIV 00420 B. TEL AVIV 00391 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham; reasons 1.4 b/d
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel Defense Force (IDF) Deputy Chief of Staff MG Dan Harel in a meeting with Ambassador Cunningham and senior U.S. officials said Egyptian and U.S. assistance is critical to slowing the flow of weapons and munitions into Gaza. Cooperation against smuggling is better with Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman than it is with Egyptian Military Commander Field Marshall Tantawi, according to Harel. He added that the focus should not only be on the area immediately surrounding the border, but also on the smuggling routes that begin in the Sudan. He advised that solving the problem would not just a technical issue, but would be one of political will. Harel suggested that the U.S. could use its leverage against Egypt in order to prod Cairo to do more. It was important to do so soon, as HAMAS was getting more sophisticated weaponry from Iran, to include longer-range missiles. Harel assessed Operation Cast Lead,s achievements and speculated about any future operations in Gaza. He noted in closing that Israel had several demands that HAMAS would have to agree to in order to have the crossings opened. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) U.S. State Department officials participating in the meeting included Ambassador Cunningham, Ambassador Stephen Mull from the Office of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, NEA/ORA Director Michael Adler, and PM officer Constantinos Nicolaidis. Mike Dumont, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, also participated, and USDAO officer served as notetaker. -------------------------------- TUNNELING AND SMUGGLING CONTINUE --------------------------------
¶3. (S) In an office call with a visiting U.S. senior official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff MG Dan Harel said he appreciates the role of the U.S. in leading the recent effort in Copenhagen to address the Gaza smuggling problem with the international community, and reminded all that smuggling into Gaza has been a long-standing issue. Harel also stated that while Israel conducted over 500 air sorties over the tunnel complexes along the Philadelphia corridor during Operation Cast Lead, they were not so nave as to think that the tunnels were all destroyed, and indicated that since the ceasefire up to 100 tunnels have been rebuilt. Harel also pointed out that the focus on Gaza was part of a bigger campaign to address the main issue of Iranian support to HAMAS, along with Tehran,s aid to smuggling and terrorist operations across the region. ------------- ROLE OF EGYPT -------------
¶4. (S) In response to a query on Egyptian seriousness in stopping smuggling, Harel stated that Egyptian support was split. On the Intelligence side under Suleiman cooperation was good. On the military side, however, Field Marshall Tantawi was dragging his feet. Harel also explained that the issue was more than just a technical issue, or an ideal number of Egyptians troops along the Philadelphi; it was more about willpower.
¶5. (S) Harel said that fighting the problem from the last 1000 meters before the Philadelphi border is useless and we should instead address the source of weapons, which come from well-known routes beginning along the Sudanese-Egyptian border. The majority of weapons smuggling comes from the Sudan border and makes its way by land across Egypt and into the Sinai, according to Harel. A small portion comes through Yemen, and some from Lebanon, but the Israeli sea blockade forces vessels to off-load in Egypt before goods can move towards Gaza. Once in the Sinai, according to Harel, there are only four major paved roads, and Egypt could easily interdict these routes with road blocks. Harel reiterated Egypt must close the border with Sudan, control the four roads in the Sinai, and change its Bedouin Policy. -------------- U.S. INFLUENCE --------------
¶4. (S) Harel said that the only real leverage on Egypt can come from the U.S. and opined it is the only country that Egypt will heed. Additionally, Harel assessed that the U.S. is the only country that can effectively lead the international community in any serious anti-smuggling efforts. Harel expressed understanding that there were legal mechanisms and protocols that must be worked out before commencing operations that include stopping ships on the high seas, but told the group that tunnels were being repaired and Iran was in the process of building a HAMAS-specific, longer-range missile that could be introduced into Gaza. ------------------------------------------- MORE SOPHISTICATED IRANIAN WEAPONS TO HAMAS -------------------------------------------
¶5. (S) In response to a query on the sophistication of HAMAS weapons, Harel stated that HAMAS had Chinese and Iranian made 122mm rockets with a range out to 30 kilometers. The Iranian version of the 122mm was designed specifically for HAMAS, as it came in four pieces that could fit through narrow tunnels and be reassembled in Gaza. Harel also stated that sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) were found in Gaza, to include the Russian made KONKOURS system. HAMAS also had SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and sophisticated improvised explosive devices of all varieties. Lastly, Harel said that Israel has sensitive intelligence that Iran is constructing an additional HAMAS-specific missile, based on the Fajr, that will have a range beyond 40 kilometers. ------------------- OPERATION CAST LEAD -------------------
¶6. (C) Harel explained that Cast Lead actually proceeded better than expected, and there was pressure during the campaign to widen the initial objectives of the operation. Harel stated there were three options briefed to the national leadership: 1) a limited operation to achieve a better cease fire agreement, 2) the seizure of Rafah and the Philadelphi Strip, and 3) retaking Gaza and destroying HAMAS. Harel said that while the decision was made to go with the first option, there was pressure to finish off HAMAS while the IDF had the chance. He added that Israel would not have any options the next time. Harel also said that the IDF and Shin Bet (ISA) are confident that around 800 Palestinians died in the operation, with the status of approximately 200 unknown. "We have 673 names of HAMAS operatives that were killed, and the names of 288 innocents," he explained. ------------------------------------------ OPENING THE CROSSINGS AND HUMANITARIAN AID ------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Harel admitted that whether the IDF wanted to be in the humanitarian business or not, the IDF was obliged by law to continue to provide humanitarian support to Gaza, and the delivery of humanitarian supplies were a daily part of Cast Lead. It was HAMAS, Harel stated, that decided to continue to shoot even during the humanitarian pauses, and the recent seizure of humanitarian supplies from UNRWA by HAMAS further proves who cares more about civilians in Gaza. In response to a question on how the international community can get Gaza,s borders open, Harel said there were several conditions -- Gilad Shalit is released; there is a cease fire agreement in place; HAMAS stops all rocket fire into Israel; HAMAS slows its force build up; and mechanisms are in place to slow the smuggling into Gaza from the Sinai. Harel further stated that Israel must control who the aid is assisting, and that Israel is not ready for the free flow of goods into Gaza.
¶8. (U) Ambassador Mull has cleared this cable. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM