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Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL83, US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ISTANBUL83 | 2009-03-03 06:06 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Consulate Istanbul |
VZCZCXRO7492
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIT #0083/01 0620654
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030654Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8801
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000083
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY;
ASHGABAT FOR TANBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH;
DUBAI FOR IRPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM IR
SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US
BADMINTON TEAM
REF: IRPO DUBAI 95
Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: A trusted contact claims he was told by a
close advisor to Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Iran
denied visas for the planned February 4, 2009 visit of the US
women's badminton because of the USG's "bad faith" in
announcing the visit earlier than Iran had requested.
According to the contact, Supreme Leader Khamenei only agreed
to the visit after Ahmadinejad urged him to do so, and only
on the understanding that no public announcements would be
made until after the team's arrival in Iran. Instead, the
USG announced the visit on February 2, as the team was
awaiting Iranian visas in Dubai. The regime wanted to
maintain full control of media coverage of the event, to
avoid a replay of the 1998 US wrestling team visit, when
Iranian crowds were filmed waving American flags and cheering
the US team. The regime believed the USG issued the early
announcement to create a similar dynamic, and now Khamenei
and Ahmadinejad feel "burned." Comment: If accurate, this
scenario underscores the challenges to building trust with a
regime that feels an obsessive fear of losing control over
both the process and substance of possible engagement with
the USG. End Summary.
¶2. (S) "A first test": A trusted contact of ConGen
Istanbul's Iran Watcher who recently returned from a visit to
Tehran recounted a detailed explanation he said he received
from a close advisor to President Ahmadinejad over why Iran
refused to issue visas in early February to the US women's
badminton team. In comments that track with IRPO Dubai's
reftel reporting, our contact says he was told that Supreme
Leader Khamenei was initially opposed to allowing the visit,
but President Ahmadinejad urged him to accept it. Even
though planning for this cultural exchange began before the
Obama administration took office, the regime including
Ahmadinejad believed this represented an important early
gesture by the new administration to build confidence and
show respect, and therefore a "first test" whether Iran could
work effectively with the Obama administration.
¶3. (S) Maximum GOI control: According to the presidential
advisor, the Iranian side insisted on a "carefully
calibrated" sequence of timing as a key requirement for
allowing the visit to proceed. Iran believes it had a clear
understanding with the USG (working through the US and
Iranian badminton federations, which in Iran's case took
instructions directly from the President's office) that
announcement of the badminton team's travel to Iran and
participation in the Fajr Tournament would be embargoed until
the tournament's opening ceremony on February 5. Iran
demanded this condition because Iran's leaders still remember
with discomfort the 1998 US wrestling team's visit to Iran,
when -- because of what Iran now sees as a failure on its
part to insist on airtight control over media coverage of the
event -- Iranian and international press broadcast scenes of
Iranian crowds cheering wildly as the US team entered the
arena carrying an American flag and continued to cheer the US
team during its matches, sometimes even waving American flags
in support. Khamenei demanded that there be no possible
repeat of such a scene within Iran. Given that the badminton
tournament was a women's sporting event and women's sports
are not televised in Iran, the regime felt confident it could
maintain full control over the event itself, allowing press
coverage only of the opening and closing ceremonies. To
maximize its control, the regime insisted on an embargo over
any announcement or media coverage of the US team's
participation until the team's arrival, i.e., after the team
had been issued visas in Dubai and flown to Tehran. This
important detail was explicitly agreed between the sports
federations, representing (in Iran's view) an understanding
between the highest levels of the USG and GOI, the
Ahmadinejad advisor insisted to our contact.
¶4. (S) "We were burned": Thus, when surprised regime
leaders saw the February 2 State Department announcement of
the badminton team's participation in the Fajr Tournament,
according to our contact, they immediately assumed "bad
faith" on the part of the USG, concluding that this was an
deliberate effort by the administration to gain advantage
over the GOI and undercut the regime's control of media
coverage of the event. The regime's immediate response,
ordered by Khamenei, was to refuse to issue the visas. As
the Ahmadinejad advisor explained to our contact: "Battles
of this nature, when foreign visitors come to Iran to
participate in sensitive or symbolic events, must be on our
terms and under our full control. We had an understanding
ISTANBUL 00000083 002 OF 002
with the U.S. over how this would proceed, and we were
burned." He added that Ahmadinejad, having personally
persuaded a reluctant Khamenei to allow the visit, felt
particularly aggrieved, and speculated to his close advisors
afterwards that this was evidence of "anti-Iranian influence"
among recently appointed foreign policy officials in the USG.
In typical Iranian fashion, GOI spokesmen blamed the
cancellation on other factors, including (from the MFA) the
"time consuming process" of visa issuance and (from Keyhan
and other conservative mouthpieces) the USG's failure to
condemn Israel over Gaza. But according to our contact,
Tehran assumes Washington "fully understands the real reason"
for the cancellation.
¶5. (S) Comment: Although it may seem far-fetched that such
a non-political exchange visit would be cancelled over a
seemingly mundane detail like the timing of the press
announcement of the visit, in Iran's case this scenario is
entirely plausible. If accurate, this scenario highlights
the challenges to building confidence with a regime that
feels an obsessive fear of losing control over either the
substance or process of possible engagement with the USG.
Indeed, this underscores that to Iran the process of
negotiations may often be as critical to demonstrating
"goodwill" and to ensuring eventual success as the substance
of the negotiations. This scenario also illustrates the
regime's rigid expectation that, with regard to early
confidence-building measures from the USG (especially
involving CBMs likely to generate press coverage), the GOI
must feel fully in control over how such measures play out,
and that at the first sign of any deviation from what it
believes is an agreed process, its first instinct --
reflective of its acute fixation on self-preservation -- will
be to shut the process down and blame the other side. End
comment.
WIENER