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DE RUEHC #0237 1121850
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P 221823Z APR 09
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TO AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 040237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL EWWT PHSA UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE:  REPORTING ON THE FEBRUARY 24-25, 2009 
NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP 
 
Classified By: EUR Acting DAS Anita Friedt Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)

1.(S) SUMMARY: On February 24-25, 2009, the semi-annual U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation Working Group (NPWG) discussed important international security issues in Washington, DC. Characteristic of a close partnership, there was a frank and useful exchange of views and ideas on a number of issues, including the current state of affairs within the multilateral nonproliferation regimes, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and bilateral nonproliferation-related projects. In a change from the two previous meetings, Ukraine stayed in a holding pattern on key areas of cooperation, particularly related to nuclear and radiological projects and small arms/light weapons destruction. A new theme also emerged in Ukraine's explanations for its many security-related challenges: Russia or the Former Soviet Union was the reason for many of the problems in Ukraine and the government lacks the resources to address these issues, particularly in the context of the economic crisis. Despite U.S. willingness to provide assistance to address many of the problems, Ukraine continues to be unable to make or follow through on the necessary commitments to implement projects. The current economic crisis and political situation in Ukraine will make it difficult to make progress on longstanding issues in the near term. However, as has been demonstrated over the last several years, continuous pressure/engagement has been an effective method for advancing U.S. interests in Ukraine and will be key to resolving longstanding issues.

--------------- Opening Remarks ---------------

2.(C) The meeting was opened by Ian Kelly, EUR Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Ambassador Oleh Shamshur, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. DAS Kelly noted that this working group is in keeping with the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in December 2008 that highlights the strategic importance of our relationship. Kelly praised the 2008 successes in U.S.-Ukrainian nonproliferation cooperation, including work related to the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative and export controls. However, there continue to be areas where progress is needed, including destruction of small arms and light weapons and projects related to the disposition of highly-enriched uranium. Ambassador Shamshur echoed Kelly's comments regarding the importance of the relationship and that the Charter creates a strong basis for nonproliferation and arms control cooperation.

------------------- G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction/Nuclear Smuggling -------------------

3.(SBU) Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) Coordinator Michael Stafford opened the first agenda item by thanking Ukraine for its enthusiastic participation in the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and NSOI. The U.S. continues to be fully committed to supporting the ongoing projects and looks forward to future cooperation. Since the last Working Group meeting, nearly seven million dollars had been committed to projects in Ukraine. Also, a review of Ukraine's progress in implementing the joint action plan against nuclear smuggling had determined that twenty-seven of the thirty steps in the plan were either complete or in progress.

4.(SBU) Continuing, Stafford highlighted several areas where the U.S. believed additional efforts are needed to build on existing cooperation. Specifically, several donors for the VECTOR II project to build and load a new radiological source storage facility currently lack legal agreements and protections needed to carry out some elements of this project, and they need Ukrainian assistance to resolve these issues to avoid future delays on the project. Stafford also sought an update on Ukraine's proposed changes to the Criminal Code to strengthen nuclear smuggling laws that were submitted to the Rada in September 2008. Finally, the U.S. offered assistance in planning a workshop focusing on a comprehensive government response to incidents of nuclear and radioactive smuggling. Stafford proposed a meeting in Kyiv to discuss this workshop in May or June.

5.(SBU) Oleksandr Nikonenko, Director, Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thanked Stafford for the comprehensive review of the status of the projects. He said that the approved projects do not cover all areas of need and emphasized the continued need for additional support for regulatory development and border security. Mykola Proskura of the Ministry of Emergency Situations stated that 150km of the Ukraine-Belarusian border is in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ). Assistance is needed to secure the border and prevent illicit trafficking of radioactively contaminated material from the CEZ. The U.S. side agreed to review the specific proposals and respond to the Ukrainian side about whether these needs could be addressed in the context of existing projects or whether revisions to the project list would be necessary.

--------------------------------- Proliferation Security Initiative ---------------------------------

6.(SBU) Jane Purcell (ISN/CPI) provided a brief overview of the U.S. and Ukraine discussions of a draft Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) shipboarding agreement. In particular, Purcell asked whether Ukraine had any reaction to the February 11, 2009 update of U.S. positions on key issues regarding the agreement. Purcell noted that the U.S. believes we are closer to agreement on a couple of the issues since the last discussions in February 2008, and offered to continue expert-level discussions on the agreement.

7.(SBU) Nikonenko responded that Ukraine is an active supporter and participant in PSI, but more importantly, the State Border Guard Service is ready for a meeting to discuss the ship boarding agreement in Kyiv. Nikonenko reviewed Ukrainian perceptions of areas of agreement and disagreement in the draft, and made a point of noting that the boarding request forms had been approved by the Ministry of Transportation. (Note: Nikonenko was repeating comments that the USG had received informally from the Ukrainian embassy in November 2008.) Purcell suggested a practical next step could be to hold a videoconference through U.S. Embassy Kyiv to clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement. During a break, Nikonenko agreed this would be a good idea.

------------------------------------- NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund -------------------------------------

8.(SBU) PM/WRA's Steve Costner reviewed the current state of play of the NATO-Partnership for Peace (PfP) destruction project (for which the United States is the Lead Nation) and urged Ukraine to make all the remaining weapons available for destruction (approximately 268,000 of the original destruction commitment of 400,000 remain). However, consistent with our discussions in December on the issue, the U.S. is reviewing Ukraine's proposed methods for demilitarizing the small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) covered under phase 1 (one)of the project. While the U.S. had not yet finished the technical review, the initial response from our experts was it would not meet U.S. requirements. We were also not clear on how Ukraine concluded that it could make money on selling the weapons as replicas given the small market for such weapons and the costs involved in demilitarizing them. Costner also inquired what Ukraine planned to do with the millions of other weapons in its stockpile.

9.(SBU) Nikonenko began by nothing this was the first issue he had to deal with on taking up his new position. He continued to note that he was relieved to hear the U.S. was prepared to continue phase 1 of the project. (Note: While this is true, continuation of phase one is conditioned on either resuming destruction or finding a mutually acceptable means to demilitarize the SA/LW, which was not mentioned by Nikonenko. End Note.) Nikonenko also highlighted that Ukraine had decided to eliminate 52,000 of the remaining 268,000 weapons and indicated his position that SA/LW destruction should not be an obstacle to addressing Ukraine's munitions destruction needs, which now entail five million tons of munitions and six-and-a-half million land mines. Costner reiterated that we fully support the complete implementation of the PfP project, including additional larger caliber munitions, but Ukraine must live up to its commitments. In addition, if phase 1 can be completed, the U.S. would be prepared to increase munitions destruction in phase 2.

10.(SBU) On the demilitarization proposal, Nikonenko disagreed with Costner's assessment because these weapons are an asset that can be sold for a profit, which is critical given Ukraine's economic situation. This issue was not just one for the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Ministry of Economy. He suggested that the U.S. just buy the weapons from Ukraine on a commercial basis and we can dispose of them as we like.

11.(SBU) Costner closed the discussion by indicating the U.S. had no objection to Ukoboronservice performing the 6000 tons of munitions destruction, which is being paid for with the remaining funds in the PfP Trust Fund. (Note: If no agreement is reached on the outstanding weapons to be destroyed, the United States and NATO will end the project with the expenditure of funds on hand, resulting in approximately 6000 tons of munitions destroyed instead of the original target of 15,000. End note.) He also noted that the Explosive Waste Incinerator to be installed at Donetsk still needed some modifications to deal with the high mercury content of the munitions in Ukraine. Nikonenko thanked Costner for this and said that the destruction of 6000 tons of munitions will help on the issue of the SA/LW demilitarization/destruction. Costner used this opportunity to indicate the U.S. offer of additional funds for munitions destruction if Ukraine agrees to destroy more MANPADS remained on the table. Nikonenko responded Ukraine is not in a position to destroy any MANPADS, but would sell them to the U.S.

--------------- Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes ---------------

12.(SBU) Ukraine's State Export Control Service representative Reshetilov provided an update on what Ukraine is doing related to the four multilateral nonproliferation regimes. -- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Ukraine said that it is critical to control technologies, materials, and machines that can be used for WMD delivery systems. Accordingly, Ukraine is taking steps to update its export control laws to reflect the decisions made at the 2008 Canberra MTCR Plenary. Looking forward, Ukraine noted that it supports the U.S. proposal on liquid rocket engines that will be discussed in the upcoming MTCR Technical Experts Meeting (TEM).

-- ISN/MTR Office Director Pam Durham applauded Ukraine's efforts to incorporate the MTCR Annex changes adopted at the Canberra Plenary and noted that the U.S. is working to do the same. She expressed appreciation for Ukraine's support for our proposal on liquid rocket engines, encouraged active Ukrainian participation in the April 2009 intersessional TEM in Stockholm, and urge Ukrainian participation in the Technical Outreach meeting that will follow the MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting in Paris in later April. Durham also encouraged Ukraine to plan to submit at least one paper for the 2009 MTCR Information Exchange (IE) and to be prepared to volunteer a paper when the MTCR develops a proposed draft IE agenda at the April 2009 RPOC. Finally, she asked if Ukraine had any thoughts on discussion topics for the RPOC's "brainstorming session." Reshetilov appreciated that its efforts in the MTCR were recognized by the U.S. He said Ukraine will prepare solidly for the TEM and for the 2009 Plenary. He added that Ukraine is always open to opportunities for information exchange and looks forward to more work in this area in the future.

-- Nuclear Suppliers Group: Ukraine supported the recent changes in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to allow India access to nuclear technology as an exemption. In this context, Reshetilov inquired about what the USG will do regarding past denial notifications. ISN/NESS Foreign Affairs Officer Robin DeLaBarre expressed the USG's appreciation for Ukraine's support on the India proposal in the NSG. Regarding denial notifications, the USG has not yet finished the steps required under U.S. law to allow for certain nuclear-related exports to India and as such the U.S. will continue reporting denials to the NSG.

-- Wassenaar Arrangement: Reshetilov reviewed Ukraine's recent actions in the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and discussed at length Ukraine's interest in hearing from the U.S. on Russia's proposal related to destabilizing accumulations of weapons in regions of conflict. In response to the Russia proposal question, Acting ISN Deputy Assistant Secretary Ann Ganzer indicated there was not much to say because Russia had not yet submitted a paper on the issue. Once Russia does the U.S. will carefully review it. Nikonenko responded there was already a similar paper on this issue from 1998 and the Russian proposal was 100 percent political. Ukraine believed this was a dangerous proposal, which Russia could use against Ukraine as a pretext to go to war over protecting Russian citizens in Crimea. Accordingly, Ukraine does not want to include this issue on the WA agenda. Ganzer responded that we cannot oppose discussing this issue because it is one of WA's Initial Elements, but the U.S. would only support discussing it in the General Working Group, not in the Plenary. -- Australia Group: There are a number of challenges facing the Australia Group (AG), particularly related to olio nucleotides. These could be used by terrorists as a biological weapon or for legitimate civilian applications. To help address this issue, Ukraine has held bioethics conferences and seminars for academics to sensitize them to the proliferation risk of olio nucleotides. Drew Souza from ISN/CB conveyed his appreciation for Ukraine's efforts on olio nucleotides, bioethics conferences, and looked forward to working with Ukraine at the September Plenary.

--------------- Export Controls ---------------

13.(SBU) Export Control and Related Border Security program office for Ukraine Brett Golden commended the improvements in Ukraine's export control system and conveyed the continued USG support for this program. Future cooperation should focus on more advanced assistance on investigations and enhancing Ukraine's capacity to prosecute strategic trade control violators. Golden noted, however, that the EXBS program is concerned about poor enforcement at rail and the green borders, as well as seaports. EXBS is prepared to assist Ukraine in remedying these deficiencies. Golden encouraged Ukraine to increase its regional and leadership role in export controls by participating in multinational seminars and workshops, inviting neighboring countries to participate in events held in Ukraine, and sending Ukrainian experts and instructors to third countries seeking assistance.

14.(SBU) Ukraine's State Export Control Service representative Reshetilov passed on the appreciation of Ukraine's Border Guard Service for the training and seminars EXBS has provided and reviewed the updates and changes to Ukraine's export controls, many of which were addressed in the previous session. Reshetilov highlighted a November 2008 change that simplified the analysis of dual-use goods subject to export controls, which should help improve the export license review process.

----------------- Arms Trade Treaty -----------------

15.(C) At the request of Ukraine, Nikonenko provided some comments on and solicited U.S. views on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Ukrainian delegation expressed its support for the development of universal standards for arms exports/imports, which are based on the laws of each country. The key challenge is having an ATT that prevents illegal sales, but allow for states to provide for their self Defense. Nikonenko noted Ukraine would participate in the Working Group of Government experts and noted that without the U.S. and Russia the ATT would be pointless.

16.(C) ISN/CATR's Margaret Mitchell conveyed the USG's support for an ATT and noted the primary concerns for the U.S. were more about the process than the substance. The U.S. agrees with Ukraine that there have to be high standards for regulating arms exports/imports and the key arms exporters, the U.S., China, and Russia, cannot be left behind or out of the ATT. Nikonenko thanked Mitchell for her remarks and offered four ideas for the ATT. First, the UN Register on Conventional Weapons should be the basis for the ATT. Second, the ATT should take into account the number of munitions being exported. Third, a whole new system is needed to create accountability for the export/import of explosives used to make munitions. His last point was the ATT had to include all the countries outside of the export control regimes.

------------------ UN First Committee ------------------

¶17. (SBU) Reviewing the program of work of the UN First Committee, Nikonenko commented on the large number of documents produced, but was discouraged at the quality of them and how they did not advance the international community's efforts to promote international security. For example, there was waning interest the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones resolutions. In response to Nikonenko's solicitation of U.S. views on the First Committee William Menold from ISN/MNSA agreed with Ukraine's views on the limited success of the First Committee. In fact, some viewed activity on nuclear issues as "flat," although a recent trend toward more activity on conventional weapons issues continued. Menold opined that the relative inactivity of the committee on nuclear issues was associated with the anticipation of a new U.S. administration that would likely have a favorable view of arms control and disarmament. Menold acknowledged the positive intent of Ukraine's proposals for resolutions on negative security assurances and the upcoming Preparatory Committee meeting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review process. However, both initiatives contradicted long standing U.S. policies. Review of the NPT, for example, was the province of the Treaty parties and should not be brought into the UNGA.

----------------------- Nonproliferation Treaty -----------------------

¶18. (SBU) Ukraine provided the U.S. a nonpaper, para 33, which responds to questions we had asked of most NPT Parties and conveyed the importance Ukraine places on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the need for the 2010 Review Conference to assess implementation of each article of the NPT. The NPT contains obligations on nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament. Scott Davis (ISN/MNSA) appreciated Ukraine's views on the NPT and committed to respond to the nonpaper. The U.S. was in complete agreement with Ukraine on the need to coordinate more closely on NPT issues and on the need for Parties to seek measures to dissuade other Parties from violating the NPT and then withdrawing. Concerning the 2010 RevCon agenda, the U.S. supports resolving procedural issues quickly so that Parties will have ample time to discuss the critical substantive issues that face the NPT.

---------- Post-START ----------

¶19. (C) While not part of the agenda, on multiple occasions Ukraine raised the issue of its inclusion in any successor treaty to START and provided a nonpaper (para 34). Ukraine views this treaty as critical to its security, especially the uncertainty of whether the security assurances given to Ukraine, upon its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, remain valid. In addition, Ukraine requested discussions on a bilateral security treaty with the U.S. as a way to help ensure Ukrainian security. In response to these multiple requests, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt conveyed the U.S. understanding of Ukraine's views on this matter and said the U.S. would certainly study them and provide a response in the near future.

-------------------------------- Conventional Arms Transfer Cases --------------------------------

¶20. (S) Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR, reviewed the three longstanding conventional weapons cases involving military equipment sales to Burma; contract to provide the Government of South Sudan with a range of military equipment (T-72 tanks) with the help of Kenya; and military cooperation with Syria related to air-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, communications gear and aircraft engines.

-- Burma: Mitchell recalled that for the past several meetings Ukraine has been reviewing its export policy towards Burma and asked if there had been a final decision by Ukraine. Nikonenko responded that Ukraine reviewed the USG's concerns and has decided that Ukraine will not sign any new contracts with Burma and that all the old contracts have been fulfilled over the last year. (Note: This could explain the year plus 'review process.' End Note) As all of the contracts have been completed, the GOU said there would be no more shipments of items that could be used for internal repression in Burma.

-- Syria: Mitchell noted that shortly before the NPWG the U.S. had provided new information to Ukraine regarding plans to send technicians to Syria to repair AA-10 air-to-air missiles; preparing to deliver communications equipment for armored vehicles and anti-tank guided missile components; and continues to accept orders for military hardware from Syria. Nikonenko responded that the GOU had not yet had time to review the new information and would provide a response in the near future. He did reiterate Ukraine's policy of opposing the sale of all lethal military exports Syria.

-- Sudan: In the context of the U.S. support for Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the ability of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to procure appropriate military equipment, Mitchell conveyed continued USG concerns with the transfer to the Government of South Sudan of significant military equipment. In particular, the U.S. is concerned with Ukraine's provision of tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment to Kenya, which are ultimately destined for the GOSS. Not only are these items too costly for the GOSS to maintain, but some of the equipment could fall into the hands of other entities as a result of deliberate transfer, poor stockpile security, or capture on the battlefield. In this context, the U.S. would like to know what controls Ukraine has in place to ensure the goods will not be retransferred? Has Ukraine been able to verify that the previous shipments have not been retransferred? -- In response, Reshetilov wholeheartedly denied any Ukrainian arms transfer to the GOSS. In fact, he said it would be impossible to transport tanks from Kenya to the GOSS even if one wanted to. Ukraine indicated that with the M/V Faina shipment, it had received confirmation of delivery from the Government of Kenya. (Note: It was clear that Ukraine was laying the foundation to blame Kenya for any transfer of the weapons to the GOSS.) If Kenya did divert the arms to the GOSS it would be Kenya that would be responsible and not Ukraine. End Note)

---------- UNSCR 1540 ----------

¶21. (SBU) U.S. 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte provided a presentation on the implementation and future of UNSCR 1540, which is a key element in combating WMD proliferation. Wuchte reviewed the current state of play of UNSCR 1540, noting the last extension of the resolution was for three years, which will allow for greater implementation of the requirements and less time spent on focusing on getting it renewed again. UNSCR 1540 activities have switched from focusing on reporting on what export control laws and regulations countries have to implementation of national action plans to address gaps and deficiencies. There is also the goal of promoting greater discussion of UNSCR 1540 in regional organizations and bilateral dialogue that focus on implementation. 22. (SBU) Focusing on Wuchte's comments about regional organization dialogue, Nikonenko noted that Russia proposed in February 2008 to discuss UNSCR 1540-related problems in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine will not support such a discussion as it is more appropriate to hold such conversations at the UN in New York. On a positive front, Ukraine welcomed any specific U.S. proposals on export control cooperation and noted that Ukraine's national reports will continue to be close hold/not publicly available.

----------------- SS-24 Destruction -----------------

¶23. (S) Ukraine reiterated its position on SS-24 destruction to James Reid, Director of the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the Department of Defense. Ukraine expressed its belief that the U.S. position concerning SS-24 elimination had created social problems in Ukraine and had caused delays in completing the project. Nikonenko also complained that the financing Ukraine has had to devote to the project is needed for Ukraine's economy, which is in serious trouble. Preempting the U.S. position, he also said that SS-24 elimination for Russia is significantly easier given the size of the country and the fact that it is not located in the center of Europe, which makes it hard for Ukraine to find a safe and environmentally friendly location for elimination. In response, Reid said the U.S. is fully committed to the storage and removal of propellant from and elimination of Ukraine's SS-24s loaded motor cases. In response to a recent Ukrainian letter proposing that the third stage motors be washed out using the U.S. funded wash out facility, Reid said the U.S. is willing to provide Ukraine with 33 percent of the value (approximately 80,000 USD) previously agreed to for removal of propellant from all three stages of a SS-24 eliminated. Payment will be made upon confirmation that the propellant has been destroyed and not just washed out. Nikonenko welcomed the news from Reid and pledged to report back to Kyiv the positive U.S. response.

---------------------------- Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreement ----------------------------

¶24. (SBU) Reid used the NPWG meeting to also thank Ukraine for its efforts to add two executive agents to BTRIA. The Defense Department is working with the new agents on the location of a pathogen storage facility and on disease detection, diagnosis and reporting. Nikonenko echoed Reid's pleasure at adding the new executive agents, but more importantly this allowed for real work to start. However, Nikonenko commented that BTRIA does not address all of Ukraine's problems. Ukraine needed more money to fund the building of additional pathogen and related facilities throughout Ukraine. Reid demurred, indicating the intent of BTRIA was to create a program and structure to eliminate the need to house pathogens at facilities throughout the country. Building a large system would be expensive and difficult to maintain. Rather there is an agreed number of facilities that can house them, with adequate security, and the BTRP is proposing a small but adequate number for diagnostic work. Reid reiterated that the system must be sustainable by the government of Ukraine. While Nikonenko agreed with Reid's logic, he again pressed for more resources for more facilities.

-------------------------------------- Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Removals from Kyiv and Sevastopol --------------------------------------

¶25. (SBU) Assistant Deputy Administrator from the Department of Energy, Andrew Bieniawski, reviewed the status of the disposition of HEU in Ukraine and expressed strong optimism that we are on the verge of a breakthrough on this issue. DOE has an unprecedented amount of money for Ukraine, $30 million. While there is a sense of hope for implementing this project, there is also a risk that Ukraine could lose this money if the U.S. does not receive, by May 1, a clear decision by the GOU and have the $30M committed on a contract. Bieniawski explained that given tightening budgets and the absence of an agreement and contract, some at DOE are looking to spend the money identified for Ukraine elsewhere. After May 1, DOE will no longer be able to keep the money planned for Ukraine. It is critical that Ukraine follow through on this initiative as it is not only important from a nonproliferation perspective, but the money will also revitalized the Kharhkiv Institute and create jobs.

¶26. (SBU) Nikonenko thanked Bieniawski for his report and pledged to convey this information immediately to Kyiv. He also used the opportunity to highlight some of the challenges facing the project to return the HEU spent fuel that remains after the conversion of the Kyiv Reactor. The primary problem is that Ukraine must either take back or pay for Russia to keep the waste resulting from the reprocessing of the HEU spent fuel in Russia. Ukraine has tried to reach an agreement with Russia whereby Russia would keep the waste without Ukraine paying for it, but is at an impasse and has requested that the U.S. engage Russia. In response, Bieniawski made it clear that this is an issue the U.S. cannot and will not get involved in; this is part of a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Riaz Awan, DOE representative at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, also emphasized the importance of implementing this agreement because it also impacts all future reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuel. In addition, the casks needed to ship the HEU to Russia have very limited availability. If project implementation slips, there will be very long delays in getting the HEU out of Ukraine due to other DOE commitments for the casks, and there could be a need for a new environmental study, which will only delay implementation further. In closing, Bieniawski emphasized the need for an agreement and money on a contract by May 1.

------------ Electron Gaz ------------

¶27. (SBU) As with HEU disposition, DOE's Kristin Hirsch reported that the U.S. needs to have the money identified for the work at Electron Gaz on a contract by May 1. Hirsch was hopeful that, during the March visit to Electron Gaz by a DOE team, reasonable proposals could be discussed or received by the United States. Awan emphasized all the good work done by both Ukraine and DOE, but said Electron Gaz will be a challenge. Mykola Proskura, Ministry of Emergencies, reviewed the long history of this issue and indicated that his ministry estimates the work would total about 900,000 USD. He also suggested that the U.S. hold a seminar for potential bidders to explain how to write a contract proposal, to ensure all the key and required elements are provided. Hirsch agreed this was a good idea, and stated that DOE would investigate what was necessary to hold such a seminar.

---------------------- Central Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility ----------------------

¶28. (C) Riaz Awan from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv pressed Ukraine to address all problems with the construction of the Central Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility and emphasized that this facility is in Ukraine's economic and national security. The facility would allow Ukraine to save hundreds of millions of dollars in costs associated with shipping spent fuel to Russia, give Ukraine control over the back end of its fuel cycle, and avoid potential problems with Russia related to fuel storage and supply. Moreover, this facility would allow Ukraine to cease its reliance on Russian fuel for its reactors, which would help promote energy independence. Awan pressed for the necessary Rada approvals, and for assurance that the U.S.-based company Holtec International would be paid for work completed. Awan also raised the issue of Westinghouse's fuel assembly facility, which would further Ukraine's energy independence by allowing it to diversify its fuel supply and no longer be dependent on Russia. In response, Nikonenko acknowledged the importance of energy diversification and noted Ukraine has not done what it needs to in this area.

--------------------- Hague Code of Conduct ---------------------

¶29. (C) The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) is important for global security and helps prevent illegal use of ballistic missiles, according to Nikonenko. Ukraine supports the goal of HCOC universalization and the eventual establishment of a legally binding international legal treaty on missiles (no further elaboration on this point). Nikonenko also highlighted current problems within the HCOC regarding countries not submitting their annual declarations (ADs) and pre-launch notifications (PLNs). He suggested that these issues could be overcome by the creation of a Global Missile Control System (an old Russian idea that the U.S. does not support). In addition, Ninkonenko expressed support for updating and enhancing the HCOC by including provisions from UNSCR 1540 that would prevent the illegal use of missile technology. 30. (C) ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham welcomed Ukraine's ideas for amending the HCOC and asked for specific proposals so that the U.S. could provide feedback. Durham said the U.S. strongly supports the HCOC and having all countries subscribe to it. She also agreed that the lack of annual declarations and PLNs is a problem. To increase the number of annual declarations submitted, the U.S. will continue its practice of conducting 'in-reach' to HCOC Subscribing States. Durham acknowledged the fact of non-submission of PLNs by Russia and the U.S., noting that the current U.S. policy on PLNs is to first operationalize the bilateral Russia-U.S. MOU on PLNs that was negotiated prior to the founding of the HCOC. Durham also advised that the new U.S. administration likely would be reviewing U.S. HCOC policy, including whether there is the possibility of any interim measures to notify launches under the HCOC.

---------------- SCUD Elimination ----------------

¶31. (S) Ralph Palmiero, ISN/MTR Deputy Director, gave a brief status report regarding progress the U.S. and Ukraine have been making toward the project of eliminating Ukraine's inventory of SCUD missiles and related equipment. Palmiero indicated the U.S. was close to having a response to destruction processes and logistics questions the Ministry of Defense had asked following talks held on February 12, 2009. Palmiero emphasized that more details need to be worked out before destruction efforts could begin, stressing the need for a complete inventory of items. Palmiero also noted that in February 2009, the Ministry of Defense had requested an additional meeting with U.S. experts. In response, Palmiero said the U.S. proposes holding a meeting in Kyiv on March 25 and 26. Ninkonenko assured Palmiero that Ukraine will do everything to en sure the meeting in March is productive, as Ukraine wants the elimination process to start as soon as possible.

------------------------------ Missile Nonproliferation Cases ------------------------------

¶32. (S) In response to a request for an update on the missile proliferation case involving the Ukrainian firm Arsenal negotiating to supply Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-controlled items to China, Ukraine said it did not have an update on the investigation, but would provide a response at a later date to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. However, Reshetilov did not believe Ukraine's answer would differ from the response given to the U.S. in December 2008. Reshetilov commented further that Ukraine has not received any export requests from Arsenal for the items in question. If it does, the GOU will review the request consistent with Ukraine's national laws and international commitments.

--------------------- Ukraine Nonpaper: Sharing Informal Views on the NPT: Ukrainian Viewpoint ---------------------

¶33. (SBU) Begin Text of Ukrainian Nonpaper -- Last year marked the fortieth anniversary of the NPT entry into force. Ukraine believes that the 2010 Review Process becomes an excellent opportunity to assess the implementation of each article of the Treaty and to facilitate elaboration of recommendations to the Review Conference. What are Ukraine's objectives for the NPT in general, and for the current review process in particular?

-------------------

-- We believe that the NPT regime represents a mutually reinforcing relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament, with due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty. Ukraine's main objective for the NPT is its balanced, full and non-selective application, implementation and universalization.

-- In our view, the current review process can help to establish a clear view what it intends to achieve and what ways should be laid in foundation of reaching the main goal.

-- As a chairing country of the Second Session of the Prepatory Committee to the NPT, held in April-May 2008, Ukraine would like to share the issues that, in our view, may reach progress if the States Parties to the NPT unite their will:

-- Consideration of issues related to introduction of more transparency and relevant mechanisms for verified reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;

-- Bringing new impetus to the works of Conference on Disarmament and to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

-- Establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to elaborate a universal, non-conditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States;

-- Further efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities in light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism; International cooperation in respect of the promotion of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of nuclear fuel;

-- Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty into force;

-- Measures to response to the withdrawal from the Treaty;

-- Improvements of the NPT review process B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Ukraine hope to see from the United States?

-------------------

-- We think that the key step on the part of the United States would be ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB), which will set a positive example and will trigger other ratifications required for the treaty to early enter into force and will have a significant positive impact on the current NPT review cycle and the NPT in general.

-- In order to stop the development of the new types of nuclear weapons and to take remaining nuclear weapons off alert status we hope that the United States will support the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons (FMCT).

-- A nuclear disarmament has remained so far only an aspiration, rather than a reality, Ukraine supports seeking agreements between the United States and Russia to secure further reductions in nuclear stockpiles. We expect the United States and Russia, to resume active efforts to negotiate a follow-on to START I, which expires in December 2009, with a goal of achieving further deep reductions of strategic nuclear forces. We believe that it should result in elaboration of legal agreement based on principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility.

-- Ukraine hopes that during this NPT review cycle US will use existing opportunities not only to examine all aspects of the Treaty, but elaborate mutually acceptable path for reaching the Treaty's goals. C. What does Ukraine believe would represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters?

-- In our view, success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference should not be assessed merely in terms of the adoption of a consensus final document. Certainly, Ukraine's strong preference would be for the 2010 NPT Review Conference to produce a consensus substantive and ambitious document, which would contain a track record of compliance by all the parties with all their commitments, and would provide a bold vision of the actions to be pursued in order to revitalize the NPT.

-- We expect that the 2010 Review Conference at the close of the review cycle reaffirms the commitment of States parties to all undertakings of 1995 and 2000 and to addressing the challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

-- Ukraine does not want to see too much of our limited time and resources to be spent on procedural issues, since they, in reality, represent only tools of the review process, but not its objectives. Ukraine will strive to have a substantive and productive discussion on important issues. -- What is most important for Ukraine is that the Conference's outcome provides the international community with a clear, well-grounded and irreversible assurances for the new progress in the future. D. Does Ukraine believe that NPT parties should take action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what actions would it support?

-------------------

-- In order to promote implementation of all NPT-related issues, including those outlined below, Ukraine would support measures improving NPT governance. In particular, we favor establishing a secretariat charged with monitoring, coordinating and reporting and a mechanism for convening meetings of State parties to the NPT to address issues of withdrawal and of compliance with both disarmament and non-proliferation requirements. Ukraine also supports the establishment of a standing bureau, which would be capable of addressing these issues on short notice. Non-compliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North Korea

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-- Ukraine expects that the United States and the Russian Federation will commit to strong cooperation to settle the dispute over Iran's nuclear issue. In Ukraine's view, solving of Iranian issue should be kept on the basis of the diplomatic engagement rather than increasing pressure of threats of force, taking into account the recognition of Iran's role in the Middle East.

-- To some extent, codification of negative security assurances could serve as an additional incentive for Iran as well as for the remaining hold-out countries (DPRK, Israel, India, and Pakistan). In this regard, Ukraine supports the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances which would elaborate universal, non-conditional and legally binding instrument on negative assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the Treaty

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-- Appropriately addressing the DPRK case is essential to maintaining the strength and integrity of the NPT.

-- Ukraine supports the approach of addressing the security concerns behind non-compliance and withdrawal while emphasizing the consequences of withdrawal and non-compliance. Another important step could be consideration of a mechanism to prevent withdrawing states from continuing to use material and technology gained while party to the Treaty.

-- Agreed interpretation of Article X to provide for more strict regulations of the withdrawal procedure, which could include a requirement for a well-founded reason for the withdrawal at the special conference of the NPT states or the referral to the UN Security Council. NPT capabilities for prompt and appropriate response to withdrawal could be sought in the institutionalized mechanism for convening meetings of State parties to address issues of withdrawal.

-- Ukraine would support the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2010 Review Conference to address all aspects of this issue. The lack of NPT universality

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-- Determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty are needed. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia. Other mechanisms could entail widening nonproliferation regimes for instance to include the FMCT and CTBT, nuclear weapon-free zones, security assurances, convening UN special session or a study by the UN Secretary-General. Finding parallel processes for the hold-out states could also prove productive. The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol

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-- Ukraine recognizes the importance of the IAEA safeguards as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commends the important work of the IAEA in implementing safeguards to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty. The Model Additional Protocol is an essential and indispensable tool for effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system. -- We express our support for the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and establishing these two instruments together as the NPT verification standard.

-- In our view, the IAEA Additional Protocol together with the nuclear export control regimes should be regarded as standard for any nuclear cooperation, without prejudice to the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT. Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations for the fullest possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations

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-- The growing energy demand and interest in nuclear technology carry proliferation risks, which might be contained by means of promotion of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of nuclear fuel.

-- Ukraine has recently joined the international uranium enrichment center in Angarsk which does not limit our free choice regarding development of national fuel cycles consistent with the Treaty. Thus, Ukraine remains to be interested to discuss the existing proposals, including the establishment of a fuel bank of low enriched uranium and multilateral enrichment centers, as well as fuel supply assurance mechanisms and would endorse solutions to be found under the aegis of the IAEA.

-- We support the idea of conducting a comprehensive study of the existing proposals on multilateral nuclear fuel cycle supplies and services in order to explore ways of best way to provide a framework for the development of nuclear energy applications in a safe, secure and proliferation-resistant manner, while reflecting economic reality and the real needs of the recipient countries.

-- The value and importance of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation program should be emphasized in view of its important role in furthering objectives of article IV. Fulfilling the Treaty's Obligations to pursue Negotiations Relating to Nuclear Disarmament

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-- The unequivocal undertakings agreed to and laid out in the 1995 Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament adopted in 2000 remain valid and (text omitted).

-- Ukraine hopes that the nuclear weapons states reaffirm their serious commitment to advancing nuclear disarmament, first and foremost, by taking practical steps to reduce nuclear arsenals.

-- We expect the United States and the Russian Federation to follow on form START and SORT treaties and make deeper cuts based on the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and verifiability.

-- The early entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of FMCT negotiations will create a favorable political momentum in support of other disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

-- We share the importance of treaty-bound disarmament measures regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, which could be covered by a post-START treaty. The first step towards their reduction and elimination could be their withdrawal to a central storage (facility).

-- Ukraine would support the establishment at the 2010 NPT Review Conference of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of implementation of article VI as well as to consider other issues of concern to the NPT States Parties which have direct bearing on the subject. Transparency on the Part of Nuclear Weapon States with Regard to their Nuclear Weapons Forces and Policies

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-- Ukraine welcomes proposals concerning transparency, confidence-building and more structured reporting by the nuclear weapon states. -- In particular, we would support the creation of a structured mechanism for tracking progress on the numbers of weapons, deployed, dismantled or destroyed. In our view, the establishment of national institutional infrastructures in nuclear weapons states for implementing nuclear disarmament could be an important contribution towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament.

------------------- Post-START Nonpaper -------------------

¶34. (C) Begin Text of Ukrainian Nonpaper: On the Future of the START Treaty and Perspectives for Development of the New Legally Binding Document in the Sphere of Strategic Offensive Arms Control and Reduction

-- Our State ensured complete implementation of its obligations under the START Treaty and under the provision of the Trilateral statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA, and the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994.

-- Ukraine advocates the START extension (ends in December 2009). With respect to the Ukrainian obligations under the Treaty it provides the basis for cooperation between Ukraine and the US in the sphere of final IBM SS 24 elimination, including destruction of the 160 solid-propellant rocket engines being stored in the Pavlograd region.

-- Expiration of the START Treaty may harm the implementation of the US-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002.

-- We pay special attention to those START restrictions in the sphere of strategic arms deployment, which prevent even from the theoretical possibility to launch the new arms race (pp. 2-29 of the Article V).

-- Ukraine is deeply concerned that the START Treaty expiration may create ambiguity upon the further validity of the assurances in accordance with the Memorandum on Security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT (signed in Budapest by Russia, UK, US, and Ukraine and supported later by France and China).

--The most acceptable option is the START extension for the next five years, as it is envisaged by p.2, Article XVII of the Treaty.

--In case if the American and the Russian sides reach the final agreement on elaboration of the new document, the interests of Ukraine would be met both by the engagement in the negotiations on the documents format and in the framework of the new, legally agreed mechanism of the strategic stability support.

--If Ukraine stays behind the new Agreement, the interests of our state could be met by the legal confirmation of the security assurances provided for Ukraine in 1994 by the nuclear states, first of all by the USA and as our leader partner in the nonproliferation and disarmament process.

¶35. (SBU) Delegation Lists:

------------------ Ukraine Delegation ------------------

Oleksandr Nikonenko, Director, Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kateryna Bila Second Secretary, Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mykola Proskura First Deputy Head of the State Department - Administration of Exclusion Zone, Ministry of Emergencies and Affairs of Population Protection from the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe Igor Reshetilov Deputy Head of the State Export Control Service of Ukraine

----------------- U.S. Delegation -----------------

Anita Friedt Head of Delegation Director, Office of Policy and Regional Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State Ann Ganzer Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and Negotiations, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Pam Durham Director, Office of Missile Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Ralph Palmiero Deputy Director, Office of Missile Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Steven Costner Deputy Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Department of State Matthew Hardiman Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Policy and Regional Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State Michael Stafford U.S. Negotiator, for Nuclear Security and Dismantlement, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State William Malzahn Acting Director, Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Margaret Mitchell Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Lauren Catipon First Secretary, Political U.S. Embassy Kyiv Riaz Awan Department of Energy Office U.S. Embassy Kyiv James Reid Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threat, Global Security Affairs, Department of Defense Jane Purcell Foreign Affairs Officer, Office Counterproliferation Initiatives, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Tom Wuchte U.S. 1540 Coordinator, Office Counterproliferation Initiatives, Bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Brett Golden Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Export Control Cooperation, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Alexander Liebowitz Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State William Menold Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State Scott Davis Deputy Director, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State CLINTON