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Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE264, NETHERLANDS/JSF FLYING INTO THE PERFECT STORM
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE264 | 2009-04-23 14:02 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0264/01 1131458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231458Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2781
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000264
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF FLYING INTO THE PERFECT STORM
REF: A. 08 HAGUE 468
¶B. 07 HAGUE 714
¶C. 07 HAGUE 247
...
203795,4/23/2009 14:58,09THEHAGUE264,"Embassy The Hague",
CONFIDENTIAL,,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0264/01 1131458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231458Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2781
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000264
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF FLYING INTO THE PERFECT STORM
REF: A. 08 HAGUE 468
¶B. 07 HAGUE 714
¶C. 07 HAGUE 247
¶D. 07 HAGUE 063
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Michael Gallagher for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The philosophical opposition of Labor Party
members, the economic crisis, and unfavorable U.S. reports
have brought Dutch support of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Program to the political breaking point. Parliament is in a
stalemate as it goes into a second day of emotionally charged
debates. The future of Dutch JSF participation -- and the
survival of the ruling coalition -- hangs in the balance.
Post believes the coalition will survive, but any procurement
of JSF test planes will come with a political cost. End
Summary.
Labor Party views:
------------------
¶2. (SBU) The Labor Party (PvdA) as a major coalition partner
in the Dutch government has faced considerable pressure from
the rank-and-file to oppose the JSF from the very beginning
of the coalition (reftels B and C). The PvdA has always been
philosophically opposed to being a partner in the development
of the JSF. However, in 2006, party leaders were convinced
during the formation of the coalition that they had to agree
to a decision timeline on JSF in order to be a part of the
coalition government. The coalition accord states ""The
Memorandum of Understanding on the JSF test planes will be
signed in 2007. In 2008 the business case will be reviewed
before decision-making takes place in 2009 on signing the
contract for the definite procurement of test planes. On the
basis of the review and of comparison on price, quality, and
term of delivery with possible other aircraft, the cabinet
will present a decision to parliament in 2010 on the
replacement of the F-16."" Under pressure from PvdA leader
and Finance Minister Woulter Bos and PvdA floorleader
Mariette Hamer, the PvdA congress on March 15 refrained from
adopting resolutions on JSF and budget cuts. Hamer urged the
congress to give the party leadership room to negotiate. At
that time 83% of the PvdA rank and file opposed the purchase
of the test aircraft.
Economic crisis:
----------------
¶3. (SBU) The economic crisis has given a platform for the
PvdA to rally against what is perceived as a costly program
at a time where the funds should be used for critical
services or offsetting the effects of the crisis. The
handling of the crisis by PvdA party leader Bos has given him
and the party a credibility that they can use for a political
advantage. Bos did not disagree in March with a poll that
showed that 84% of those interviewed believed that postponing
the procurement of the JSF would be a good measure.
Mixed U.S. signals:
-------------------
¶4. (SBU) Adding to the complexities of the decision has been
the mixed signals coming from various sectors within the U.S.
Perhaps most often referred to by the PvdA has been the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports that have been
extremely critical of the JSF. This was compounded on a
recent trip when a GAO official noted that it would be too
risky to proceed with buying JSF aircraft. The uncertainty
of the U.S. defense budget for the JSF and the subsequent
impact on the overall cost of the program is also a concern
to members of Parliament. This is the first time the Dutch
have been in a major equipment development program vice an
off-the-shelf purchase. The PvdA and opposition parties have
Qoff-the-shelf purchase. The PvdA and opposition parties have
been extremely critical at every stage of the business plan
and have focused on each and every negative report or comment
from any source, credible or not. The extensive number of
articles clearly critical of the JSF from U.S. sources,
specifically Winslow Wheeler and Pierre Sprey, continue to
add fuel to the argument against the JSF program.
Next steps:
----------
¶5. (SBU) Parliament will continue to debate JSF tonight.
The Socialist Party will reportedly introduce a resolution
calling on the government to end participation in JSF, and a
majority of parliament appears ready to support that
resolution. The cabinet will then consider, but is not bound
by, the resolution. If the cabinet opposes the resolution
and decides to proceed with the JSF test plane purchase, in
effect disregarding parliament, opposition parties are then
likely to propose a vote of no confidence. These decisions
and votes could take place today, ahead of parliament's
recess, or could require the parliament to reconvene on
Tuesday, April 28.
PvdA dilemma and prospects for a compromise:
-------------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) If/if there is a no confidence measure. PvdA members
will face a difficult choice. If they oppose the no
confidence measure, they undermine their opposition to JSF.
If they support the no confidence measure, they bring down
the government. With low numbers in the polls, PvdA would
expect to lose seats and perhaps any role in a future
coalition government. The largest coalition party, PM
Balkenende,s Christian Democrats (CDA), also faces potential
losses in an election. Despite these incentives for
compromise, PvdA leaders have left themselves little room to
change position, stating they will not support the purchase.
They insist that it is premature to commit to JSF and that
purchasing of the test aircraft de facto implies a decision
in favor of buying JSF in the future. In addition, PvdA has
seen a number of other political losses during their
participation in the coalition government, including
decisions on the Afghanistan deployment, the EU referendum,
and road taxes. Nonetheless, PvdA leader Marriet Hamer has
said this issue is not worth a cabinet crisis.
Comment:
--------
¶7. (C) COMMENT: The Parliamentary debate on the JSF is more
about politics than it is about the merits of the program.
The coalition will most likely survive this brinkmanship by
the PvdA and the Christian Democrats (CDA) - the potential
losses at the polls are too great -- but the storm will have
damaged the credibility of both parties. The Dutch JSF
program will continue to have fierce opponents, but
ultimately the Dutch will probably purchase at least one test
aircraft to remain a participant in the JSF program. The
political damage and subsequent impact on next year's
decision for the purchase of operational aircraft remains to
be seen. END COMMENT.
GALLAGHER