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Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT757, IRAN POST-ELECTION: [Source removed] CALLS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASHGABAT757 2009-06-15 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO8851
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAH #0757/01 1661308
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151308Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2979
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5316
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0100
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3560
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000757 

SIPDIS 
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN 

EO 12958 DECL: 06/15/2019 
TAGS IR, TX, PGOV, PREL, PHUM 
SUBJECT: IRAN POST-ELECTION:  [Source removed] CALLS 
RESULTS A “COUP D’ETAT;” SAYS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DEMAND A RECOUNT
ASHGABAT 00000757 001.2 OF 002

Classfied By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) In a conversation today with Iran Watcher, a [Source removed] in Ashgabat labeled the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in Friday’s presidential election a “coup d’etat,” and called Iran’s incumbent President “another Pinochet.” [Name removed] said that based on calculations from Mousavi’s campaign observers who were present at polling stations around the country and who witnessed the vote counts, Mousavi received approximately 26 million (or 61%) of the 42 million votes cast in Friday’s election, followed by Mehdi Karroubi (10-12 million). According to his sources, Ahmadinejad received “a maximum of 4-5 million votes,” with the remainder going to Mohsen Rezai. He said that more than anything else, the huge turnout of voters on Friday was a reflection of the Iranian electorate’s overwhelming “anti-Ahmadinejad” sentiments.

PRECINCT RESULTS OBSCURED

2. (C) [Name removed] said that in a clear departure from established electoral rules and practice in Iran, including the procedures followed in the 2005 presidential election and last year’s legislative elections, the authorities embargoed the results from individual precincts and announced instead that they must be conveyed directly to the central election authorities, who would announce the overall results after all the votes were counted. The Iranian authorities knew, he said, that attempts to falsify individual precinct counts could be countered by observers from the Mousavi and the other campaigns, so in order to engineer a “lopsided” Ahmadinejad victory, they had no choice but to conceal the precinct results. In his words, “People know who they voted for and the observers know who won in each precinct.”

ARAB REACTION: A HUGE DISAPPOINTMENT

3. (C) [Name removed] said that Iranians are puzzled by the muted reaction thus far of the U.S. and EU governments, as well as “very disappointed” by the number of Arab rulers who have sent messages to Ahmadinejad congratulating him on his “victory.” He said that the international community should acknowledge the illegitimacy of the election and demand that the Iranian authorities release and account for the results from each precinct. He said the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) was behind the “coup.” Even Supreme Leader Khamenei, he said, to whom the IRGC owes allegiance, is “not totally in control” of the IRGC. Citing the IRGC’s warnings against a “velvet revolution” in the days leading up to the election, it would appear that the IRGC has taken on “a life of its own.”

IRANIAN DIPLOMATS GET 4TH OF JULY INVITATION INSTRUCTIONS

4. (C) During a visit to the Iranian Embassy in Ashgabat last Friday to vote, [Name removed] said that, without exception, “everyone he spoke to” who was there to cast their ballot said they were voting for Mousavi. [Detail removed]
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: “OUR ONLY OPTION”

5. (C) [Name removed] said that the Iranian authorities, particularly the IRGC, are “merciless” and, “unlike the government in 1979,” will use any level of force necessary to put down Iranians who attempt
ASHGABAT 00000757 002.2 OF 002
to demonstrate or force an annulment of the election. Instead, he said, the most effective means to counter the results will be in the form of peaceful, civil disobedience. “The people need to act in concert and ‘shut down the country.’” “If no one goes to work and the government cannot function,” he said, “this will cause them to think again.”

6 (C) COMMENT: During our conversation our interlocutor recalled the words of his father [detail removed] during the lead-up to the 1979 revolution. He said that his father warned him against joining the revolution and to “watch out for the Islamists.” “Once they get power,” he had said, “they’ll never relinquish it. People are going to be sorry.”  END COMMENT. MILES