VZCZCXRO9820
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0477/01 1671520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161520Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4921
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1487
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0894
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0834
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0956
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0422
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0018
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 5455

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA 
ERIKSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/9/2019 
TAGS: ECON EINV ENRG EPET ETRD PGOV EAGR LY
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Ukraine to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and higher education. The Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and the two sides discussed establishing an investment center in Ukraine to oversee Libyan projects related to oil, gas and agriculture in Ukraine. The next step is ostensibly for Libyan officials to visit Ukraine in July for discussions under the rubric of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee; however, the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting will occur as scheduled. Given the slow pace at which Libyan-Ukrainian ties have progresed to date, it is unlikely that many of the projects discussed during the visit will be implemented soon. The Ukrainian Ambassador was reportedly told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about the proposed deals because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and the perception that Ukraine was not a stable investment venue. End Summary.

AGREEMENTS SIGNED

¶2. (C) During the mid-May visit of Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and higher education. Russian DCM Anatoly Martynov told P/E Chief in early June that he had received a readout from Ukraine's Ambassador to Tripoli shortly after Tymoshenko's visit. The military-technical agreement had been under discussion since 2004 and provided a basic framework for military cooperation and training. Ukraine wanted to sign it during the March 2008 visit to Tripoli of Ukraine's President, but the Libyan side was unprepared to do so. During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian side also proposed establishing a center in Libya to refurbish Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters; however, the GOL deferred a decision. The protocol on the exchange of sensitive information was described as essentially being an agreement by both sides not to disclose military or intelligence information obtained from the other without securing prior permission to do so.

¶3. (C) The nuclear energy cooperation agreement was discussed during the March 2008 visit by Ukraine's president. Libya has already signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement wtih France and a memorandum of understanding with Russia that commits Russia and Libya to conclude a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy. (Note: Libya's efforts to establish nuclear power generating capability do not appear to be moving quickly. Dr. Mohammed Ennami, Deputy Director of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, told Econoff that Libyan officials were to have Libyan officials were to have visited France in April to follow-up on the France-Libya nuclear deal, but there are no indications that the project has progressed. End note.) The GOL appears to be soliciting civilian nuclear cooperation from a number of different potential bilateral partners.

LIBYA INVESTING IN UKRAINE'S DOWNSTREAM OIL SECTOR ...

¶4. (C) During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and Tymoshenko said she expected all 17 to be finalized and signed during a putative meeting of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee in Kiev in July. The Ukrainian Ambassador said the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting would take place as scheduled. Casting doubt on the projects' viability, he told Martynov that he should add the phrase "it would be nice if ..." as a prelude to the text of each proposed contract reported in the press. The parties held preliminary talks on establishing a Libyan investment center in Ukraine to oversee joint projects related to oil, gas and agriculture. In the energy sector, the proposed projects are for the supply of 600,000 tons of Libyan oil to Ukraine's Kremenchug refinery, the construction of an oil refinery in Ukraine, the building of ten fuel stations, the modernization of Ukrainian thermoelectric power stations, and the participation of Libyan investment funds in the privatization of the Odessa Port-Side Plant.

... AND POSSIBLY IN WHEAT PRODUCTION TRIPOLI 00000477 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) Martynov said Tymoshenko wanted to approve an agreement for Libya to cultivate 100,000 hectares of Ukrainian land for production of wheat that would be exported to Libya; however, the Ukrainian Ambassador told him the proposal would likely encounter stiff opposition in the Ukrainian parliament. Press reports quoted Ukrainian officials as saying implementation of the deal could be bogged down by difficulties over land legislation and ownership. The government of Ukraine does not own sufficiently large tracts and the private companies that own the land do not need government assistance to work with any foreign investor. (Note: Libya imports nearly all of its food, including wheat and flour, and has recently purchased and leased tracts in sub-Saharan Africa with the stated goal of securing stable supplies of food staples. End note).

¶6. (C) Comment: Even factoring in our Russian colleagues' obvious motivations for down-playing the visit (Martynov stressed that the GOL had assured Russia in the run-up that Libya was "not siding with Ukraine"), Tymoshenko's trip appeared to have been of a piece with the many high-level visits hosted by Tripoli. That is to say that it was long on ceremony and announcements, but short on real substance. While cooperation on civilian nuclear energy could be a long-term strategic move by Libya to maximize revenues from oil exports by generating electricity through nuclear energy for domestic needs, it remains unclear whether any of its agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation, to include that with Ukraine, will bear fruit. The scheme for Libya to grow wheat in Ukraine appears to have been ill-conceived. Martynov said the Ukrainian Ambassador had been told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about many of the proposed Libyan deals in Ukraine because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and perceptions that it was not a stable investment venue. End comment. CRETZ