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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI543, POWER PLAY ON LIBYA'S HEU TRANSFER COMMITMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI543 2009-07-09 08:08 2011-01-31 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO6127
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0543 1900855
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 090855Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0080
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0070
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5535
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000543 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ISN/NESS D. FENSTERMACHER; DOE-M FOR M. 
TSIKLAURI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/8/2019 
TAGS: KNNP ENRG TRGY LY RS
SUBJECT: POWER PLAY ON LIBYA'S HEU TRANSFER COMMITMENTS 
 
REF: A. STATE 52146 B. TRIPOLI 427 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: Working-level Government of Libya (GOL) representatives reported that preparations were underway for transfer of Libya's highly enriched uranium (HEU), with shipment planned for September 29. Based on their extensive preparations for the transfer, working-level GOL representatives believe PM al-Mahmoud al-Baghdadi will sign the bilateral agreement to transfer the HEU to Russia, but MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri separately told us that Al-Baghdadi could prove to be an obstacle. Fituri nevertheless was confident that the agreement would be signed. End summary.

MOVING SLOWLY...BUT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

2.(S/NF) During a June 27-29 DOE visit to the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center, Dr. Ali Gashut, Secretary of the National Authority for Scientific Research, said that the GOL's nuclear spent fuel-return agreement was currently with PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, whom Gashut believed would sign the agreement on behalf of the GOL. Gashut indicated that al-Baghdadi would sign the agreement, which has been in his office since May (ref B), within a week. Meanwhile, a Russian Department of Energy counterpart indicated to the DOE team that the GOL's parallel agreement with Russia to accept Libya's nuclear spent fuel was also in al-Baghdadi's office, although the Russian did not have any other specific information regarding that agreement.

FLIGHT OF THE TOXIC WASTE

3.(S/NF) The Tajoura facility is planning to receive DOE containers in late July, which will be used to transport the nuclear spent fuel to Russia for final disposal. DOE and the Tajoura facility are preparing the final shipment to take place early in the morning of September 29, via an Antonov 124-100 stretch plane that will fly out of Metiga Air Base. The shipment is expected to arrive in Russia on the evening of September 29.

4.(S/NF) The GOL has made clear that it does not want its high-level waste to return to Libya after it has been treated in Russia. The GOL has already agreed to pay a fee of USD $30,000 to have the Russians bury it in a secure location.

BUREAUCRACY AT WORK

5.(S/NF) MFA A/S-equivalent Fituri tempered Gashut's optimism regarding the GOL's nuclear spent fuel-agreement during a July 6 meeting with the DCM. After Gashut had interrupted the meeting to seek Fituri's clearance on the GOL's draft response to ISN DAS Mitman's letter regarding the transfer agreement, Fituri hinted that PM al-Baghdadi had put a hold on moving the agreement forward for reasons he did not know xxxxxxxxxxxx. During a brief encounter in Sirte on July 3, the Ambassador stressed to the Prime Minister that he needed to resolve this issue very quickly if we were to move to expand further cooperation. Fituri said that he had pointed out how problematic the issue was for FM-equivalent Musa Kusa. Fituri thought their next move would be to raise the matter with Colonel al-Qadhafi during his visit to Italy for the G-8 Summit xxxxxxxxxxxx. In a separate July 8 meeting, Fituri clarified that FM Kusa had recommended approval of the transfer and predicted that Libya would meet its obligations, although the timing may be a bit later than desired (septel).

6.(S/NF) Comment: Fituri's comments hint at power-jockeying within the Libyan bureaucracy, and post expects to receive positive news on the agreement once the dust settles. The GOL is fully aware that there will be no movement on further cooperation in the civilian nuclear field until Libya fulfills its commitments on the shipment. Post will continue to press the GOL to fulfill its nuclear program agreements and to raise the seriousness of the issue at the highest possible levels. End comment. CRETZ