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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000584 
 
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DEPT FOR NEA ACTING A/S FELTMAN; ALSO PM/RSAT (MMILLER),T/ISN,NEA/MAG,DRL/NESCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS PHUM ETRD ABLD CVIS LY UN
SUBJECT: BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP TRIPOLI 00000584 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1.(S/NF) Summary. Your visit to Libya will set the tone and agenda for the bilateral relationship over the next several months. Libyan officials seek clarification of the Administration's policy toward Libya, especially after their mishandling of the Fathi al-Jahmi case, and are unsure of the degree of engagement they can expect. They continue to complain that Libya has not been adequately "rewarded" for previous policy decisions to give up its WMD programs and support for terrorism, yet they are remiss in meeting key WMD deadlines. You can lay out the path toward increased engagement in the wake of the new Washington consensus and press for real progress. Potential deliverables from the visit include: a statement announcing the intention to engage in a Human Rights Dialogue and a Political-Military Dialogue with high-level State officials; Libya's signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement; formation of a visas working group to discuss bilateral visa problems; and setting a date to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). You can also privately raise the notion of establishing a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue, incumbent upon GOL signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. The Libyans will be looking for a concept of how we envision conducting the human rights dialogue and assurances regarding the possibility of a meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. They will also continue to press for security assurances. End Summary.

PRESSING LIBYA TO FULFILL ITS WMD COMMITMENTS

2.(S/NF) The GOL has been credited with having largely met its WMD commitments; however, the recent track record is worrisome and suggests that it may be deliberately delaying implementation of commitments it has undertaken under the rubric of the U.S.-U.K.-Libya Trilateral Steering and Coordination Committee (TSCC). The GOL has delayed since November 2007 signing a U.S.-Libya agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel (the HEU-LEU agreement); delayed signing a parallel Russia-Libya agreement; and given no details on plans to sell its uranium yellowcake stockpile. If work on the spent nuclear fuel transfer to Russia is not completed by September 30, 2009, the Department of Energy's work to complete the program may be delayed for upwards of two years. The GOL has also delayed the implementation of its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to destroy its remaining stockpile of declared chemical weapons (approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860 MT of chemical agent precursor chemicals). The deadline established by the CWC Conference of the States Parties for the destruction of Libya's mustard stockpile is December 31, 2010; destruction of the remaining inventory of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than December 31, 2011.

3.(S/NF) A proposed visit by ISN DAS Mitman in late June to discuss Libya's WMD obligations and rewards was scrapped at the eleventh hour when the GOL failed to issue visas to the delegation. GOL interlocutors recently blamed the Prime Minister for slow-rolling on Libya's WMD commitments. A GOL official told the DCM that the Foreign Minister planned to address the issue with Qadhafi and that he understood that inaction by the Prime Minister-equivalent, who still views renewed bilateral relations with suspicion, is detrimental to the relationship. Post believes the GOL is slow-rolling, in part, as leverage against a guarantee to discuss security assurances. We urge you to press your interlocutors on the need to expeditiously sign the agreement, linking that action (the signing of the HEU shipments) to any future discussions regarding cooperation in the civil nuclear field and a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue.

ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

4.(S/NF) During a recent meeting with the Ambassador, FM-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed agreement on behalf of the GOL to launch a Human Rights Dialogue, whereby the U.S. and GOL would discuss sensitive human rights issues - in both a general and specific sense - and provide a forum for joint-action in the human rights sphere. You should lay out for the FM a concept of how we envision the dialogue and get agreement for the official launch of the dialogue next month by a team of USG officials. MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri has hinted that the GOL may press for inclusion of the Human Rights Dialogue as part of a broader strategic dialogue. The meeting with Musa Kusa may be the appropriate venue to publicly announce our intention to initiate the human rights dialogue.

VISAS AND NSEERS

5.(S/NF) Post began full nonimmigrant visa operations for Libyans in April. Since that time, we have issued over 1000 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with wait times that range from a TRIPOLI 00000584 002.2 OF 003 few days to several weeks due to Security Advisory Opinion requirements. The GOL continues to adhere to restrictive visa issuance policies vis-a-vis Americans, including an apparent virtual ban on tourist visas for Americans, lengthy delays and exorbitant fees for American business people, and a long record of visa refusals for USG-sponsored visitors for academic, cultural, science, economic, and other programs. The GOL has agreed, in principle, to the idea of forming a bilateral visa working group to resolve these issues, including visa reciprocity. During a July 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Musa Kusa maintained that visas for Americans would continue to receive the most scrutiny of any foreign visitors to the Jamahiriya, for security reasons. Your underscoring for the Libyans that the current imbalance in visa issuance is not sustainable will show your interlocutors that the issue has been raised to high levels in Washington.

6.(S/NF) An ostensibly related issue involves the treatment of Libyan travelers at U.S. ports of entry, particularly Libyan officials, who are routinely separated from other passengers at ports of entry and questioned extensively about their travel. GOL officials, who view the issue as a personal affront, will raise it with you. Musa Kusa and UNPermREP Shalgham are only two of the several high level Libyan officials who have been "mistreated" at our ports of entry, and their experiences have engendered deep resentment here. Your recent letter to DHS described the issue well; we believe that we will not be able to make significant process on visa reciprocity until we make some headway here. A DHS delegation is scheduled to visit Tripoli in late July to address treatment of Libyan officials at U.S. ports of entry/NSEERS issues with GOL counterparts, among other issues. However, the GOL has not yet granted visas to the delegation.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

7.(S/NF) USTR has been working with the GOL to finalize a TIFA text for over a year. The GOL last invited Emboffs to review the draft text on November 24, 2008. Despite post's attempts to discuss TIFA with Libyan trade officials at every possible opportunity, the text has languished on the Libyan side. We would like to press the GOL to sign a TIFA as soon as possible. We concur with USTR view that the signing should take place even in light of renewed problems regarding Caterpillar and potential problems involving the Chevrolet dealership. We may have a better hand to play on these issues when we can argue them out in this formal framework.

MEGRAHI

8.(S/NF) The Megrahi case is likely to be an agenda item for your interlocutors. Qadhafi raised the issue during his July 9 meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown, and recent press reports suggest that Megrahi's physical condition is deteriorating (although the UK Embassy was not able to corroborate such reports during a July 19 meeting with the CDA). If the issue is raised, we recommend that you remind Libyan officials that the decision to allow a Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) for Megrahi is a matter for the Scottish Government to decide. UK Embassy officials believe that a PTA decision could be forthcoming in mid-August. We defer to the Department's view on a possible request for Megrahi's compassionate release.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9.(S/NF) While Libya's regional focus at present seems to have concentrated primarily on its pan-African agenda, Qadhafi has skillfully leveraged the AU Chairmanship to ingratiate himself with European and South American leaders - most recently Silvio Berlusconi. His visits to Moscow, Madrid, Paris, Lisbon, and Rome have afforded him opportunities to sign military-to-military agreements and to engage on civil-nuclear issues, as well as to negotiate commercial energy and investment deals. He has even exploited EU, especially Italian, concerns about illegal immigration to press forward his security and political agendas. As Qadhafi's engagement as an African leader has expanded, he has notably decreased his efforts in the Arab world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians - "Isratine" - including during his May meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward. The Libyans will appreciate anything you can relate regarding the work of Special Envoy Mitchell and how we see Administration policy playing out in the peace process. TRIPOLI 00000584 003.2 OF 003

POTUS-QADHAFI MEETING

10.(S/NF) The desire on the Libyan part for a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at UNGA in New York is palpable. In our discussions here, we have implicitly linked a "good atmosphere" for that meeting to Libyan agreement on the human rights dialogue. With their assent to that proposal and the handshake in L'Aquila, the Libyans will seek assurances that the meeting will happen. To the extent you can bring any further clarification on that, the more warmly you will be welcomed by your interlocutors.

BUILDING A HOME BASE

11.(C/NF) On the embassy front, we have experienced significant personnel changes, and the new team is settling in nicely. We are disappointed that the move of the entire embassy to the villa site has been pushed back by several weeks, but we are looking forward to the time when the mission will be united. We have a good LES staff, but they have not been fully integrated into the embassy ethic given the distance between the two sites.

12.(C/NF) We continue to need high-level engagement from the GOL to facilitate our efforts to purchase a property for a New Embassy Compound (NEC) and close the deal on compensation for our seven U.S. properties here in Tripoli. You may want to remind Libyan officials that a New Embassy Compound will be an important symbol of our growing relationship. You may also want to seek the Prime Minister's assistance in resolving outstanding payments due under the compensation agreement for our seven properties. The Land Registry Office claims that it has not received funds to implement the agreement, while the Ministry of Finance claims that the Land Registry Office has the funds. We believe the Prime Minister's intervention will be needed to resolve this standoff. POLASCHIK