Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AR
ASEC
AEMR
AORC
AJ
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AE
AU
AFIN
AX
AMED
ADCO
AG
AODE
APER
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AM
AL
ASIG
ABLD
ABUD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
AGMT
ATRN
CO
CH
COUNTER
CDG
CI
CU
CVIS
CIS
CA
CBW
CF
CLINTON
CM
CASC
CMGT
CN
CE
CJAN
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CG
CS
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CV
CAN
ECON
ETTC
ELN
EPET
ENRG
EFIN
EAID
EINV
EG
EWWT
ELAB
EUN
EU
EAIR
ETRD
ECPS
ER
EINT
EIND
EAGR
EMIN
ELTN
EFIS
EI
EN
ES
EC
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENVR
ENIV
EZ
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ECA
ET
ESA
ENERG
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IR
IS
IAEA
IZ
IT
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
IN
IO
ID
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
IIP
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INRB
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
KNNP
KDEM
KIRF
KWMN
KPAL
KPAO
KGHG
KN
KS
KJUS
KDRG
KSCA
KIPR
KHLS
KGIC
KRAD
KCRM
KCOR
KE
KSPR
KG
KZ
KTFN
KISL
KTIA
KHIV
KWBG
KACT
KPRP
KU
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KV
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KTIP
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KMCA
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KVPR
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBIO
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KHDP
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
KCOM
KDEV
MOPS
MX
MNUC
MEPP
MARR
MTCRE
MK
MTRE
MASS
MU
MCAP
ML
MO
MP
MA
MY
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASC
MASSMNUC
MPOS
MZ
MOPPS
MAPP
MG
MCC
OREP
ODIP
OTRA
OVIP
OSCE
OPRC
OAS
OFDP
OIIP
OPIC
OPDC
OEXC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PREL
PTER
PINR
PINS
PARM
PHUM
PARMS
PREF
PBTS
PK
PHSA
PROP
PE
PO
PA
PM
PMIL
PL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PGOVE
POLINT
PRAM
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PGOF
SMIG
SNAR
SOCI
SENV
SO
SP
SW
SHUM
SR
SCUL
SY
SA
SF
SZ
SU
SL
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
SN
SG
UK
UNGA
UP
UNSC
UZ
UN
UY
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNO
UNEP
UG
US
USTR
UNHCR
UNMIK
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI795, Hesnawy is a charismatic and gregarious character, who spoke fluent American English. He used American expressions and slang with ease and was clearly trying to endear himself to P/E Chief. He said that he has been head of Libya's Chemical Weapons Program for the last 12 years and was intimately aware of every technical detail relating to that program. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, Hesnawy may be working with National Security Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on missile purchase requests.
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI795.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI795 | 2009-10-05 15:03 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO1980
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0795/01 2781540
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051540Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5334
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0088
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1173
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0844
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0624
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5881
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000795
NOFORN SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CBC (FERGUSON); NSC FOR MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/5/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV CWC OPCW LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION CHIEF DEFENDS EXTENSION REQUEST REF: A) STATE 100809; B) TRIPOLI 490
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(S/NF) Summary: Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, head of Libya's chemical weapons destruction program, defended Libya's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) extension request, arguing that a grassroots environmental campaign and civil defense concerns regarding possible accidents or leaks required additional time to meet Libya's obligations to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and convert Rabta 1 and
¶2. Except for the alleged grassroots environmental movement, most of Hesnawy's argument seemed plausible. Hesnawy also provided a detailed update on Libya's progress. Plans are in place with the Italian company SIPSA to build the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility in time for destruction to commence November 1, and work is progressing with the company PharmChem on the Rabta conversion project. Hesnawy said he was prepared to deliver a detailed presentation of Libya's progress during the October 12 Executive Council session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Libya also briefed representatives of the French (jointly with post) and UK (separately) embassies here on its progress. End Summary.
HESNAWY JUSTIFIES EXTENSION REQUEST
2.(S) During a September 30 meeting, Pol/Econ Chief jointly delivered ref a demarche with French DCM to the head of the chemical weapons destruction program at Libya's National Chemical Weapons (CW) Authority, Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy. During the meeting, Hesnawy also provided a detailed briefing on his progress toward meeting Libya's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) commitments. Libyan MFA International Organizations Officials Murat Humaima, and Tajouri Shiradi also attended the meeting.
¶3. (S) Hesnawy gave a long explanation of the reasons for the extension request, including resistance from the local community when construction work began at the building site for the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. He explained that local residents complained about the idea of a CW destruction facility being built in their neighborhood and alerted environmental authorities to their concerns; then "all hell broke loose," he said. Hesnawy said that the "environmental agency" began asking tough questions regarding the emissions that would be released by the facility and requested verification of a number of control standards. Hesnawy bragged that he had successfully answered the questions and had come to an agreement with the agency. [Comment: Given tight Libyan Government controls over national security facilities and programs, we find it hard to believe that a grassroots movement could affect Libyan policy or action on a sensitive program such as the Rabta facility. End comment.]
3.(S/NF) Hesnawy then explained that the next problem he confronted was with the "civil defense people," who were concerned about securing the transfer of the chemical weapons and precursor materials from the storage to destruction sites. They demanded that emergency procedures be developed to ensure quick and appropriate response in the event of an accident or leak, which according to Hesnawy, has created additional delays. [Note: The UK DCM, who visited the storage facility earlier this year, told P/E Chief that the containers currently housing the material were in fact leaking when he observed them. End note.]
4.(S) On a positive note, Hesnawy reported that the ground at the site has been leveled, fencing and gates have been put in place, and water and energy sources have been built for the facility. A pipeline approximately 250 meters from the site will supply water from the Great Manmade River, and a power station about two kilometers away will support "an 11 kilo volt electricity line" to the facility.
UPDATE ON SIPSA WORK
5.(S) Hesnawy said that he had met with Italian company SIPSA September 29 (ref B) and emphasized the necessity of building the structure in an efficient way, to enable Libya to meet its CWC deadlines. By his estimation, since the destruction must commence on November 1, 2010, with the destruction of one-percent of the Libyan CW stock, the facility must be ready for operations by October 29, 2010. He thought that destruction of one-percent of the CW would take one day to complete. In order to meet those deadlines, Hesnawy and the SIPSA designers agreed that the facility should be composed of 90% steel, which TRIPOLI 00000795 002 OF 002 would provide for faster construction. Furthermore, they had decided that the foundation will consist of a single platform, rather than separate, individual platforms. Hesnawy exuberantly claimed to be "convinced that Libya can meet its deadlines~if there are no other delays." He said that his extension request was for a total of 5-6 months, and he believed that destruction of the precursors would be completed on schedule.
6.(S) Hesnawy explained that a Technical Secretariat (TS) team recently visited the sites and inspected the storage of the mustard gas and precursors, and they had agreed with his reasons for requesting the extension and destruction timeline.
RABTA CONVERSION PROGRAM
7.(S) Regarding the conversion of Rabta 1 and 2 facilities, he explained that the list of equipment submitted in the amendment request had been dictated by European rules, since the company that was working to convert the facility, PharmChem, was European and was designing the pharmaceutical plant according to EU standards.
REQUEST FOR SUPPORT
8.(S) Hesnawy requested U.S. support during the October 12 Executive Council session and in weighing in with European delegations. P/E Chief emphasized that transparency and timely reporting were absolutely essential to U.S. support for Libya's requests. Hesnawy claimed that he agreed and had always been an advocate of transparency and communication on such issues. He said that he would be delivering the explanation of the Libyan requests at the OPCW Executive Council session. The French DCM was silent throughout the briefing and said he would confer with the Elysee on the Libyan request for support.
UK EMBASSY WARNS OF HESNAWY'S CONFIDENCE
9.(S) In a separate meeting, xxxxxxxxxxxx told P/E Chief that while the MFA IO officer Tajouri Shiradi had made the same request for support for Libya's CWC requests, he did not provide as much detail on the progress of the Libyan program. xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed surprise that Hesnawy had met with us, relating that he was an elusive character who had not wanted to meet with him in the past, even though they had worked together when xxxxxxxxxxxx had served as part of the xxxxxxxxxxxx Delegation to the OPCW. xxxxxxxxxxxx described Hesnawy as xxxxxxxxxxxx and said that while part of the Libyan argument for the destruction deadline extension was credible, the other part was just talk.
10.(S/NF) Bio info: Hesnawy is a charismatic and gregarious character, who spoke fluent American English. He used American expressions and slang with ease and was clearly trying to endear himself to P/E Chief. He said that he has been head of Libya's Chemical Weapons Program for the last 12 years and was intimately aware of every technical detail relating to that program. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, Hesnawy may be working with National Security Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on missile purchase requests.
11.(S/NF) Comment: The Libyans made an effort to meet with us on short notice and were ready to provide detailed information about the status of their CWC commitments and requests. While most of the argument for the extension was plausible, certain aspects of Hesnawy's justification (i.e., protests from the local population) do not seem to fit with the Libyan political environment. The fact that we received significantly more access than the UK Embassy seems to indicate that the Libyan Government appreciates the importance of continued WMD progress to our bilateral relationship. End Comment. POLASCHIKJA